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OVER  THE  PAST  thirty  years, macroeconomists  thinking  about aggregate 
labor market  dynamics  have organized  their thoughts  around  two rela- 
tions, the Phillips  curve and  the Beveridge  curve. The Beveridge  curve, 
the relation between unemployment and vacancies, has very much 
played second fiddle. We think  that emphasis  is wrong. The Beveridge 
relation comes conceptually first and contains essential information 
about  the functioning  of the labor  market  and  the shocks that affect it. 
Labor markets  in the United States are characterized  by huge gross 
flows. Close to  seven million workers move either into or out of 
employment  every month.1  While that movement could be consistent 
with workers  reallocating  themselves across a given set of jobs, recent 
evidence  by Steve Davis and  John  Haltiwanger  suggests  that  these flows 
are associated  with high  rates ofjob creation  and  job destruction.  Using 
a measure  of job turnover,  defined  as the sum of employment  increases 
in new or expanding establishments and employment decreases in 
shrinking  or dying establishments, Davis and Haltiwanger  find that 
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1. Information  on gross  flows  of workers  comes from  the monthly  Current  Population 
Survey.  It is well known  that  measurement  error  leads to an upward  bias in the raw data 
on gross flows, and various  adjustments  have been suggested  to remove the bias. The 
number  in the text refers to the gross flows as adjusted  by Abowd and Zellner  (1985). 
Poterba  and Summers  (1986),  using  a different  method  of adjustment,  obtain  an estimate 
of those flows  equal  to only 60 percent  of the Abowd-Zellner  estimate. 
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during 1979-83, a period of shrinking  employment,  job turnover in 
manufacturing  averaged  some 10 percent per quarter.2  From a macro- 
economic viewpoint, the labor market  is highly effective in matching 
workers and jobs,  yet those flows are so large that they imply the 
coexistence of unfilled  jobs and unemployed  workers. Examination  of 
the joint movement  of unemployment  and vacancies can tell us a great 
deal about the effectiveness of the matching  process, as well as about 
the nature  of shocks affecting  the labor market.  In this paper, we first 
develop a conceptual  frame  in which to think  about gross flows, about 
the matching  process, and  about  the effects of shocks on unemployment 
and vacancies. We then turn to the empirical  evidence, using data for 
the postwar United States. We focus first on the matching  process, 
estimating the "matching  function," the aggregate relation between 
unemployment,  vacancies, and new hires. We then interpret  the Bev- 
eridge  relation.  More precisely, we look at the joint behavior  of unem- 
ployment,  employment,  and  vacancies, and  infer  from  it the sources and 
the dynamic effects of the shocks that have affected the labor market 
over the past 35 years. 
Our conceptual starting  place is a minimalist  model describing  the 
gross flows of both workers  and  jobs. We think  of an economy in which, 
at any instant, many jobs become profitable  and many jobs become 
unprofitable.  To find  workers  for those newly profitable  jobs, firms  post 
vacancies. Workers  in jobs that become unprofitable  are laid off and 
look for newjobs. The complex  process through  which  workers  and  jobs 
look  for  and  find  each  other  is represented  by a simple  aggregate  matching 
function, giving new matches as a function  of both unemployment  and 
vacancies. At given rates of job creation  and destruction,  the economy 
would settle to a steady level of unemployment  and vacancies, deter- 
mined by both the rates of job creation  and destruction  and the effec- 
tiveness of the matching  process. The economy, however, is subject  to 
two types of shocks with quite different  effects. Changes  in the level of 
aggregate  activity  cause rates  ofjob creation  and  job destruction  to move 
in opposite directions,  while changes  in the intensity  of the reallocation 
process cause them to move in parallel.  The dynamic  effects of those 
two types of shocks on unemployment  and vacancies follow easily. 
Aggregate  activity shocks drive unemployment  and vacancies in oppo- 
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site directions, causing counterclockwise  movements around  a down- 
ward-sloping  locus in the Beveridge space. Reallocation shocks lead 
instead  to movements  along  an upward-sloping  locus, to parallel  move- 
ments in unemployment  and  vacancies. The model  therefore  provides  a 
way of looking  at the Beveridge  relation  and  tells us what  can be inferred 
from  the actual  comovements  of unemployment  and vacancies. 
To focus on the basic  mechanisms,  the initial  model  ignores  important 
features  of actual  labor markets.  It assumes an exogenous labor  force, 
an exogenous stock of potential  jobs, that  only the unemployed  getjobs, 
that quit rates are constant, and that all unemployed workers are 
identical.  Even a cursory  glance  at the data  shows all these assumptions 
to be wildly  incorrect.  Much  of the  movement  into  and  out  of employment 
is from "out of the labor  force," many workers move from one job to 
another without experiencing unemployment,  the quit rate is highly 
procyclical,  and  many  of the unemployed  remain  attached  to, and  return 
to, the firms  that have laid them off. To take the data into account, we 
extend the model to allow for some of those features. Throughout,  our 
emphasis  remains  on the effects of shocks on the aggregate  labor  market 
variables.  The picture  we get is richer  than,  but  fundamentally  similar  to 
that  obtained  in the initial  model. 
Critical  to our  thinking  about  labor  markets  is the notion  of a matching 
function.  This function  hides a complex reality  in which  geographic  and 
skill differences  between workers and  jobs, as well as the intensity of 
search  on the part  of workers  and  firms,  all matter.  One  may  legitimately 
wonder  whether  such a function  exists at all. We thus start  our  empirical 
investigation  by looking  for that  function.  To do so, we make  use of the 
gross flow series as adjusted  by John  Abowd and Arnold  Zellner  and of 
the help-wanted  index  as a proxy  for vacancies  as adjusted  by Katharine 
Abraham.3  Because adjusted  flow series begin  in 1968,  and manufactur- 
ing flow series, which we need in the construction  of new hires, end in 
1981, 1968-81 becomes the sample period. For that period, we find a 
strong, stable relation between aggregate  new hires, unemployment, 
and vacancies. The relation is well approximated  by a Cobb-Douglas 
function,  with constant  or mildly  increasing  returns,  and  relative  coeffi- 
cients of 0.4 on unemployment  and 0.6 on vacancies. The estimates 
imply that the average duration  of vacancies varies from two to four 
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weeks depending  on labor  market  conditions  and thus show two impor- 
tant  aspects of the labor  market.  From  a macroeconomic  point of view, 
matching  is highly  effective: firms  and  workers  easily achieve matches. 
Firms' ability to find workers, however, depends on the state of the 
labor  market:  employment  is not simply  determined  by demand.  Study- 
ing  the function  in more  detail  reveals  four  more  things.  First, somewhat 
to our surprise, even when unemployment  becomes very large, its 
marginal  effect on new hires does not disappear.  Second, the relevant 
pool of workers  appears  to include  some workers  classified  as being  out 
of the labor  force. Third,  the long-term  unemployed  contribute  as much 
to aggregate  new hiring  as do the short-term  unemployed.  Finally,  across 
all specifications,  we consistently  find  a negative  time trend,  implying  a 
decline  in  the  hiring  rate  at  given  levels of the vacancy  and  unemployment 
rates. 
Next we turn to the data on unemployment,  the labor force, and 
vacancies (again  proxied  by an adjusted  help-wanted  index). Our  earlier 
analysis  suggests  that  we should  think  of their  dynamics  as coming  from 
the dynamic  effects of aggregate  activity, reallocation,  and  labor  supply 
shocks (exogenous  movements  in the labor  force). We estimate  the  joint 
process generating  those three variables  and, using a set of just-identi- 
fying assumptions, recover both the shocks, or, more precisely, the 
innovations  to those shocks, and  their  dynamic  effects. We are  thus  able 
to decompose the history  of joint movements  in the unemployment  and 
the vacancy rate, the Beveridge  curve, into movements  due to each of 
the three shocks. Looking at those movements on a month-by-month 
basis, we find that aggregate activity shocks dominate, with effects 
similar  to those characterized  in our model. Except at low frequencies, 
reallocation  and labor force shocks contribute  little to the fluctuations 
in the unemployment  or the vacancy rate. Both findings  are important. 
In particular,  that  reallocation  shocks do not appear  to explain  much  of 
the fluctuations  in unemployment  confirms  the findings  of Katharine 
Abraham  and Lawrence Katz in the debate on the macroeconomic 
importance  of "sectoral  shocks.  "  4 The picture  is different  when  we look 
at low frequencies. Roughly  half the shift to the right  of the Beveridge 
relation over the postwar period is  due to  the long-run effects of 
reallocation  shocks. The  other  half  is due  to an  unexplained  deterministic 
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trend. While  this trend  could come from  trends  either  in the underlying 
shocks or in the structure  in the economy, the nature  of the movement 
and our earlier  finding  of a drift in the matching  function  point to that 
drift  as a major  proximate  cause of the shift of the Beveridge  curve. 
Throughout, our paper ignores wage determination. The formal 
justification  in  our  model  is the  assumption  that  wages  play  no allocational 
role in individual  matches, merely dividing rents between firms and 
workers. The real reason we ignore wage determination,  however, is 
our desire to concentrate first on the Beveridge relation and to leave 
other  issues to later. But it is clear that, whether  or not it is extended to 
allow  for wages to play  an allocational  role, our  approach  yields a theory 
of the joint behavior of unemployment, vacancies, and wages. Put 
crudely,  it  allows  for  an  integration  of the  Phillips  curve  and  the Beveridge 
curve. That  vacancies are a strong  determinant  of wages, stronger  than 
unemployment  in many countries, has long been documented. That 
shifts  in the Beveridge  curve  may  shed  light  on Phillips  curve  movements 
has  also long  been recognized.  In the conclusion  to this  paper,  we review 
our  main  results  and  give a brief  preview  of how our approach  may shed 
light  on those issues. 
A Minimalist Model of Vacancies and Unemployment 
The purpose  of our  initial  model  is to capture  the two elements  we see 
as essential to any description  of labor  markets.  The first  is that, at any 
particular  time, even during  the worst recessions, many firms  want to 
increase  their labor  force and many firms  want to decrease theirs. The 
second is that there is no centralized  allocation  mechanism;  firms  who 
want  new workers,  and  workers  who want  jobs, must  locate each other. 
To concentrate  on the basic implications  of those two elements,  we leave 
out most of what makes  the texture  of actual  labor  markets.'  We return 
to some of those missing  aspects in the next section. 
5. Ours  is not the first  model  of unemployment  and vacancies. We build  on the early 
work  of Holt  and  David  (1966);  Phelps  (1968);  and  Hansen  (1970).  Our  model  has, however, 
more  in  common  with  Pissarides  (1985).  Our  model  leaves  out  many  of the  effects  Pissarides 
concentrates  on; it is, as a result, much  simpler  and  can be used to study  richer  dynamic 
issues. There  is one substantive  difference  between the two models in the treatment  of 
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Workers and Jobs 
We think  of the economy as being  composed  of identical  workers  and 
jobs. Workers  can be employed, unemployed,  or out of the labor  force. 
In actual labor markets, the difference between the unemployed and 
those out of the labor  force is one of degree. In our  model, the difference 
is a sharp  one. The unemployed  look for work; those out of the labor 
force do not.  Let  E  be  the number of  employed workers, U the 
unemployed, and N the workers not in the labor force. In the initial 
model, we take the number  in the labor force, L,  as given. The first 
relevant  equation  is therefore 
(1)  L=E+  U. 
Symmetrically,  jobs can be filled, unfilled with a vacancy posted 
("vacancies" for short), or unfilled with no vacancy posted ("idle 
capacity"). Each job requires  one worker. Again, we draw a sharper 
distinction  between unfilled  jobs with or without  a vacancy posted than 
is true  of actual  labor  markets:  only firms  with  jobs for which a vacancy 
is posted are looking  for workers. Let K be the total number  of jobs, F 
the filled  jobs, V  the vacancies, and  I the idle  jobs, those that  are  unfilled 
with no vacancy  posted. Thus, 
(2)  K=F+  V+I. 
Obviously  F and  E are equal. In our initial  model, we take K as given. 
Note that, by taking  K and L to be constant, we treat the two sides of 
the market  in asymmetric  fashion. The reason will be clear below: our 
focus here is on shocks to the supply of jobs, not on shocks that affect 
whether  workers  decide to enter  or drop  out of the labor  force. 
Job Creation and Job Destruction 
In the U.S. economy,  jobs are always being created  and terminated. 
They are created  both in existing firms  and through  the appearance  of 
new firms.  They are terminated  both in existing firms  and, more drasti- 
cally, through  closures and bankruptcies.  Jobs may disappear  forever 
or temporarily.  We capture this process of creation and destruction 
through  the following  assumptions. 
We think  of each of the Kjobs in the economy as producing,  if filled, 
a gross (of wages) revenue of either 1 or 0. Profitability  for each job Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  7 
follows a Markov  process in continuous  time. A productivejob  becomes 
unproductive  with flow probability r0.6  An unproductive  job becomes 
productive with flow probability ulr.  Thus, the times to a change in 
profitability  are Poisson processes. At any time, some jobs become 
productive,  somejobs  become  unproductive.  Whether  newly  productive 
jobs are  jobs that were previously  unproductive,  or simply  new  jobs, is 
purely a matter of interpretation.  This is the mechanism we use to 
generate  the existing  large  gross  flows  ofjob creation  andjob  destruction. 
By making this process mechanistic (not dependent on underlying 
decisions) we have a simpler  (albeit less accurate)  setting for focusing 
on the complexity  of aggregate  dynamics. 
The parameters  'ro  and u  I play a central  role below. It is, however, 
more intuitive to think of two other parameters,  c and s, which are 
defined  from  'ro  and wlr.  For given 'ro  and wlr,  the proportion  of potential 
jobs that  are  productive  in steady state is given bywr  1,/Qro  + wlr);  we may 
think  of this proportion,  which we shall call c (for cycle), as measuring 
the degree  of aggregate  activity (or, more  precisely, potential  aggregate 
activity, as the proportion  of jobs productive  and filled will always be 
less than c). In steady state, the instantaneous  flow of jobs changing 
from  productive  to unproductive  (which  equals  the reverse  flow)  is equal 
to  r0'r11/(Qr0  +  ulr)  times K; we can think of this ratio, which we shall 
denote s (for shift), as an index of the intensity of reallocation  in the 
economy. 
The Matching Process 
If vacant  jobs were instantaneously  filled, the economy would have 
employment  equal  to cK. Changes  in s, the intensity  of the reallocation 
process, would not affect aggregate  employment. But the process of 
matching  workers  and  jobs is not instantaneous. 
We envision each worker and firm  as engaged in a time-consuming 
(stochastic)  process of waiting  for and  looking  for an appropriate  match. 
We formalize  this matching  process by a matching  function,  giving  new 
hires h as a function  of unemployment  and vacancies: 
(3)  h =  ox  m(U,  V), 
where ot  is a scale parameter, and mu, my '  0, m(0, V) =  m (U, 0) =  0. 
6. That  is, in any  short  interval  of time  At there  is a probability  'orAt  of the  job becoming 
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This matching function is analogous to an aggregate production 
function.  It recognizes  that  the large  labor  market  flows generate  delays 
in the finding of both jobs and workers even though the process is 
extremely  efficient.  It is simply  not infinitely  efficient. 
This function is consistent with the idea that new jobs and workers 
differ  in their  geographic  and skill characteristics,  that, for example,  the 
regions  with high  rates of job creation  may not be those with high  rates 
of job destruction.  Changes  in the parameter  ot  are intended  to capture 
such changes in geographic or other differences between jobs  and 
workers-what is sometimes  called mismatch-as well as differences  in 
search  behavior.7 
This  function  implies  the simultaneous  coexistence of unemployment 
and vacancies. An alternative  formalization  of the Beveridge relation, 
which we find  less attractive,  relies on aggregation  of separate  markets, 
each of which  has no friction,  with the outcome in each separate  market 
being either unemployed workers or unfilled vacancies. This is the 
approach  initially  followed by Bent Hansen in the first formal model 
of the Beveridge curve, and more recently by a number  of European 
researchers  working  on disequilibrium  models.8 
The Equations  of Motion 
To complete the specification of the model, we  make one final 
assumption, namely that job terminations  are not the only source of 
separations,  but that workers  quit  jobs at an exogenous, constant  rate, 
q. We introduce  quits partly  for the sake of-some-realism,  but also 
because there is a basic distinction  between quits and  job terminations 
in the model. A quit is associated with the posting of a new vacancy; a 
job termination  is not. Here again,  the distinction  is sharper  in the model 
than in actual labor markets, where quits are often used by firms to 
reduce their  labor  force and are not always replaced.  The assumptions 
that the quit  rate is constant  and that all quits are to unemployment  are 
both counterfactual,  but not central  to the issues at hand.9 
7.  For one among  many  discussions  of the matching  function  in the search  literature, 
see Howitt  and  McAfee  (1987).  An important  question,  on which  we shall  not concentrate 
here, but to which  we return  in our empirical  work  below, is that  of the degree  of returns 
to scale of m. 
8. Hansen  (1970);  Dreze  (1989)  and  references  therein. 
9.  It is straightforward  to extend  the analysis  to allow  the quit  rate  to be, for example, 
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It follows from  our  assumptions  that  the behavior  of the labor  market 
is given by a system of two differential  equations: 
(4)  dEldt = otm(U,  V) -  qE -  uDE, 
(5)  dVldt =  -otm(U, V) + qE +  w1TI  -  woV. 
We consider these equations in turn, starting  with the behavior of 
employment. 
When  ajob becomes unproductive,  there is no reason  for the worker 
to remain  on thejob.  10  Thus,  the  flow  from  employment  to unemployment 
from  this source is equal  to rrDE.  In addition,  the flow of quits  is equal  to 
qE. The flow from  unemployment  to employment  is equal  to new hires. 
For  ajob to produce  1, it must  be not only productive  but  also matched 
with a worker.  To do so, a vacancy must be posted and a worker  must 
be recruited. There are thus two sources of new vacancies. The first 
source, a flow  from  Ito V, is unproductive  jobs that  become productive; 
this first flow is equal to wjrI.1"  The second source, from F to V, is the 
need to replace  workers  who quit;  it is equal  to qE. Vacancies  decrease 
for two reasons; some are filled  by new hires, a flow from V to F. Some 
of the jobs for which vacancies were posted become unproductive,  a 
flow from V to I; we assume that  vacancies  become unproductive  at the 
same  rate  as filled  jobs. 
Using  the identities  above, we can  rewrite  these equations  as a system 
in unemployment  and vacancies, given K and  L: 
(6)  dUldt =  -onm(U, V) +  (q +  To))(L  -  U), 
(7)  dVldt =  -otm(U,  V)  +  (q -  T1) (L -  U) +  7TK  -  (o  +  7T1)  V. 
10. We  commit  a theoretical  sleight  of hand  here.  If the  probability  that  thejob  becomes 
productive  again  is high  enough,  it may  pay  the  firm  and  the worker  to stay together.  While 
the current  surplus  is equal  to zero, the firm  does not have to post a vacancy  and  wait  for 
a new worker  when the  job turns  productive  again.  We assume  that  the probability  'ai is 
low enough  that  this problem  does not arise. 
11. This is where we differ in an important  way from Pissarides  (1985). Pissarides 
assumes  that  firms  create  vacancies  until  the value  of a new vacancy  is equal  to zero. We 
assume  instead  that,  at any time, the number  of potential  vacancies,  which  depends  on the 
number  of jobs that are potentially  productive, is very much given to firms. These 
alternative  assumptions  lead  to substantive  differences  in the characterization  of the  joint 
movements  of unemployment  and vacancies. We feel that  having  the value of a vacancy 
equal  to zero is an appropriate  long-run  restriction,  but  is not appropriate  in the short  run; 
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This account of the labor reallocation  process has not mentioned 
wages. Wages  are likely to affect K and  L as well as c and  s. But we take 
K, L, c, and s as given in this model. Wages could also affect whether  a 
meeting between a worker and a firm actually leads to a hiring, thus 
affecting  m or ox.  We assume that they do not affect matching.  That is, 
we consider a situation where first the worker and the firm examine 
whether there is a mutually advantageous opportunity to begin an 
employment  relationship.  If there  is, they then  negotiate  a wage  to divide 
the surplus  from the match with no constraint  (for example, fairness, 
union contracts, or posted wages) on allowable bargains.  In a richer 
model with heterogeneous  workers,  jobs, and matches, the nature of 
bargaining  power between the two sides would still affect allocation  by 
affecting  expectations  about  future  opportunities.  We shall ignore  such 
complications,  explicitly  assuming  homogeneous  workers  and  firms,  or 
absorbing  the implications  of heterogeneity  into the parameters  of the 
model. In this way, we can  focus on the labor  force, unemployment,  and 
vacancies, ignoring  wage and price dynamics. Of course, this ignores 
important  effects of fairness constraints on wages paid to different 
employees of the same firm,  and the effects of wages set ahead of time 
on a take it or leave it basis by firms  or in union contracts. These are 
aspects left for later  work. 
Steady  State  and Dynamics 
Setting  dUldt and  dVldt to zero, we have the steady-state  values of V 
and U satisfying 
(8)  otm(U,  V)  =  (q  +  wTo)(L -  U), 
(9)  ot  m(U,  V)  =  (q -  Tl)  (L -  U) + T1K  -  (wo +  wl) V. 
Figure 1 shows the two stationary  curves, where dUldt  and  dVldt are 
each zero, as well as the directions of movement that satisfy the 
differential  equations  6 and  7. The relevant  region  of the plane  has U, V, 
E, and  I all nonnegative.  The locus dUldt = 0 is downward  sloping. It 
does not hit the V axis given that m is equal  to zero if V is equal  to zero. 
The dVldt  =  0 locus need not be monotonic. Nevertheless there is a 
unique, stable  equilibrium,  which  is always a node. 
To think  of the dynamics  of U and V, we have to specify the source 
of shocks to the economy. It is natural  to think  of changes in 'ro  and wrr Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  11 
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as the important  source of fluctuations  in the system. But looking at 
changes in one wr  keeping the other constant does not appear  to be a 
particularly  relevant  experiment.  We find it more attractive  to think in 
terms  of two types of shocks-shocks  that  affect  aggregate  activity  while 
leaving the degree of reallocation  constant and shocks that affect the 
degree of reallocation  keeping aggregate  activity constant. Using our 
earlier  definitions  of c and s, the first  is a shock to c, leaving  s constant; 
the second is a shock to s, keeping  c constant. Since Tro  = slc and TrI  = 
sl(l  -  c), we can rewrite  the dynamic  system in terms  of s and c: 
(10)  dUldt  =  -otm(U,  V)  +  [q +  (slc)](L  -  U), 
(I1)  dVldt =  -otm(U,  V)  +  q(L -  U) 
+  [sl(l  -  c)] (K-  V-L  +  U)  -  (slc)V. 
We consider first the effects of a once and for all change in s, the 
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V is easily characterized  by noticing  that setting  dUldt  = 0 and  dVldt = 
O  in equations  10  and 11  and  eliminating  s from  the two equations  gives 
(12)  (L-U)  =  cK-V. 
Thus, the locus of steady states  for different  values  of s and  a given value 
of c lies along  a 45 degree  line. 
In addition  to characterizing  steady states, it is easy to describe the 
dynamic  path from a change in s when the economy starts  at a steady- 
state point (that  is, satisfies  equation  12).  Evaluating  dUldt and  dVldt at 
a point satisfying  equation  12, we have 
(13)  dVldt =  -otm(U,  V)  +  [q +  (sic)] (cK -  V)  =  dUldt. 
Thus,  if  the  economy  is subject  only  to s shocks, to changes  in  reallocation 
intensity, it will move up and down a 45 degree line.  12 The same is true 
of shifts in ox,  the parameter  of the matching  function, which captures 
another  dimension  of mismatch.  Like changes in s, changes in cx  leave 
equation 12 unchanged, and thus also move the steady state-and 
movements  from  the steady state-along the same  45 degree  line. Figure 
2 gives the dynamic effects of once and for all changes in ox  or s on 
unemployment  and vacancies. 
Similarly  analyzing  changes in c, aggregate  activity shocks, we first 
calculate the locus of steady states for a given s and varying  c. This is 
done by eliminating  c from  the steady-state  versions  of equations  10  and 
11, to get the locus 
(14)  (L -  U +  V) [otm(U, V)  -  q(L --  U)]  =  sK(L  -  U), 
which  is downward  sloping.  This  locus, the steady-state  relation  between 
U and V for different  levels of aggregate  activity, is often what econ- 
omists have in mind when they refer to the Beveridge curve. But it is 
only a steady-state  locus. The  existing  literature  discusses counterclock- 
wise movements  around  the steady-state  locus.13  We find  indeed  that, in 
response  to changes  in c, the economy is likely  to produce  counterclock- 
wise loops around  the steady-state  locus.14 Figure  3 gives the dynamic 
12. For an economy  experiencing  both  c and  s shocks, the response  to s shocks  is not 
this simple.  The slope of the actual  path  after  an s shock  depends  on the initial  position,  as 
is clear  from  the phase  diagram  in figure  1. 
13. For  example,  Hansen  (1970). 
14. The proof and exact conditions  are as follows. We first examine the slope of a Olivier Jean Blanchard and Peter Diamond  13 
Figure  2. Shift  in Reallocation  Intensity  (s) 
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trajectory  through  some  point  on equation  14.  Each  point  on equation  14  is associated  with 
some value  of c, each trajectory  is associated  with another  value which  we denote  by c'. 
From  equations  10  and 11, we have 
dV/dU  =  (dV/dt)/(dU/dt) 
=  {-m  + q(L -  U)  +  [s/(1 -  c')] (K-  V+ L + U)  -  (sc')V}I/ 
um + q(L  -  U) + (slc')(L -  U)]. 
The issue is whether  the above equation,  evaluated  at a point  on equation  14, exceeds the 
slope  of the locus at that  point,  which  from  equation  14  is given  by 
dV/dU=  - {[V/(L -  U )] [m  - q(L -  U )] +  (L -  U +  V)(mnu + q)}/ 
[oam  - q(L -  U ) + (L -  U+  V)otmv]. 
The term  (dV/dU)  in the first  equation  is decreasing  in c'. As c' goes to one, it goes to 
minus  infinity.  Thus, the interesting  question  is that of what  happens  as c' goes to zero. 
When  c' = 0, the first  equation  equals -  V/(L  -  U ). Comparing  -  V/(L  -  U ) to the second 
equation  shows that  paths  are  always  counterclockwise  if and  only if 
Va.m  v > (L  -  U )(in  u  + q)- 
Assuming  that  m has constant  returns  to scale, this is equivalent  to 
am(U,V)>Lcamu  +  (L-U)q. 
Since am > (L  -  U )q from  equation  14, this condition  will hold  as long as umu  is not too 
large,  or equivalently  as long  as amv  is not too small. 14  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Figure 3.  Shift in Aggregate Activity (c) 
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effects of a once and  for  all  increase  in c on unemployment  and  vacancies. 
To summarize,  the high rates of job creation  and destruction  explain 
the coexistence of unemployment  and  vacancies.  Decreases  in aggregate 
activity lead to increases in unemployment  and decreases in vacancies. 
Increases in the intensity of reallocation  also increase unemployment 
but increase vacancies as well. The model clearly shows that high 
unemployment  can be due either to aggregate activity factors or to 
structural  changes requiring  the reallocation  of labor, and that looking 
at both unemployment  and vacancies can shed light on the sources of 
unemployment  movements. Before we can do so, however, we must 
take up a number  of issues brushed  aside in this section. 
Extending the Model 
Our  initial  model  is built  on many  counterfactual  assumptions.  Some 
can be relaxed at some cost in simplicity, but without changing the Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  15 
general  picture much. Some, however, need to be modified  before we 
can take the model  to the data.  15 
The first is the sharp  distinction  drawn  in the model between those 
out of the labor  force and  those unemployed.  Differences  between those 
two pools are in fact fuzzy. The flows between the two are large and 
respond  to economic  activity. And new hires  do not come only from  the 
ranks  of the unemployed.  As computations  presented  in the next section 
show, roughly  45 percent  of hires  come from  unemployment,  40 percent 
from out of the labor force, and 15 percent from employment, from 
workers  moving  directly  from  one job to another. 
The second assumption  to be moditied  is that the pool of workers 
available  for hire is homogeneous. Workers  out of the labor force but 
available  for work are unlikely  to behave exactly as those unemployed. 
Even within the unemployed, some are more actively searching  than 
others. Some keep a close attachment  to a firm  and  can simply  be called 
back  by firms;  others  are  unattached.  Many  laid  off workers  in manufac- 
turing  are  eventually  recalled,  a phenomenon,  first  emphasized  by Martin 
Feldstein, that is quite different  from the picture of the labor market 
sketched  above.  16 
We thus consider two extensions of our model. The first allows for 
both  exogenous  and  endogenous  movements  in the labor  force, focusing 
on the entry of workers in the labor force in response to changes in 
employment,  rather  than  on the direct  hiring  from  out of the labor  force. 
This extension is little more  than  the straightest  short  cut, useful mainly 
to point out basic differences  and to organize  the empirical  work later. 
The second  extension  explores  the idea  that  the relevant  pool of workers 
is heterogeneous  with respect to matching.  We focus on the distinction 
between  attached  and  unattached  workers. 
Labor Force,  Unemployment,  and Vacancies 
Steady  increases  in the labor  force, such as the entry  of new cohorts, 
trend  changes  in participation,  and  so on, are  likely  to be associated  with 
15. A description  of the various  flows in the labor  market,  of the decisions  associated 
with those flows, and of their implications  for the relation between vacancies and 
unemployment  in the labor  market  was developed  by Holt and  David  (1966)  in one of the 
early  papers  on the Beveridge  curve. 
16. Feldstein  (1975). 16  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
steady increases in capital accumulation and creation of new jobs. 
Modifying  the initial  model to allow for steady growth  of both K and L 
is straightforward.  Assume that K and L grow at the same rate n and 
assume  constant  returns  in matching.  Assume that  all new workers  start 
unemployed  and all new jobs come on line profitable.  Define u =  UIL, 
v =  V/L, and k =  KIL. Then the equations of motion become 
(6')  duldt=  - otm(u,  v) + (q + TrO  + n) (1 -  u), 
(7')  dvldt =  -otm(u,  v) +  (q -  l1)(1 -  u) +  (m, +  n)k 
-  (r0 +  a,  +  n)v. 
The analysis  then  proceeds  very much  as before, with  the implication 
that the growing  labor  force is steadily  matched  with new  jobs. Neither 
steady-state  u nor steady-state  v is necessarily  monotonic  in n. 
We want, however, also to focus on movements in the labor force 
that are not accompanied by simultaneous increases in capital, or 
movements  that occur in reaction  to movements  in labor  market  condi- 
tions. A simple  formalization  is 
(15)  dLldt = a(dEldt) + f,  I > a >  O. 
Labor  force movements  depend  on an exogenous component,  f, and 
on movements in employment:  an increase in employment  leads some 
workers  tojoin the labor  force, increases  participation,  while a decrease 
leads some to leave. The focus here is on the movements between 
unemployment  and  out of the labor  force;  the analysis  of the movements 
directly  between out of the labor  force and employment  is better done 
in a model with two pools along the lines of the model in the next 
subsection. The specification embodied in equation 15 is obviously 
rough. Decisions to enter or leave the labor  force must in part depend 
on wage  determination:  how the surplus  from  a match  is divided  between 
firms  and workers will affect the decision of workers to stay, exit, or 
enter the labor  force. For the same reason, those decisions are likely to 
depend on both vacancies and unemployment, rather than just on 
employment. 
Maintaining  the assumption  that  all hires still come from  the ranks  of Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  17 
the unemployed,  using  equations  10, 11,  and 15,  and  using  the definitions 
of s and c gives us a system in L, V, and U: 
dLldt  =  -  [aI(l  -  a)] (dUldt)  +  [1/(1  -  a)]f, 
(16)  dVldt =  -onm(U, V) + q(L -  U)  +  [s(l  -  c)] (K -  V -  L +  U) 
-  (slc)V, 
dUldt  =  -(1  -  a)o-m(U,V)  +  (1  -  a)[q  +  (slc)](L  -  U)  + f. 
In this extended model, shocks now affect vacancies, unemployment, 
and  the labor  force. And there are now three  rather  than  two sources of 
shocks: aggregate  activity, reallocation,  and labor supply shocks, c, s, 
andf, respectively. 
The effects of aggregate  activity and reallocation shocks are little 
changed, except for the positive comovements of the labor  force with 
employment.  The dynamic  effects of c and s can be derived by noting 
that, iff  is equal to zero,  one can define L*  U  +  (1 -  a)E  =  (1-  a)L 
+ a U, which is constant. Substituting  L*  in the last two equations  gives 
a system of two differential  equations  in U and V. The dynamics  of this 
system with respect to either c or s shocks are similar  to those charac- 
terized  earlier,  although  differing  in detail. 
To see the effects of labor supply shocks, it is easiest to consider a 
discrete  change  in L, rather  than  the more  complex change  infin  equa- 
tion 15. Assuming further that a  =  0 and that q =  sI(1 -  c) makes the 
analysis  easy to carry  out and is not misleading.  The dynamic  effects of 
an increase  in L are  drawn  in figure  4. In that  case, the (dVldt = 0) curve 
does not shift and the (dUldt =  0) locus shifts up. An increase in the 
labor  force thus leads to an increase in unemployment  that is less than 
one for one, and to a decrease in vacancies. The instantaneous  effect of 
the labor  force increase is to increase  unemployment  one for one, and, 
as higher unemployment  leads to a higher rate of hire, to increased 
matching.  Then, over time, unemployment  decreases and so do vacan- 
cies.  This decrease in unemployment represents a higher level  of 
utilization  of the capital stock; if we were to allow for a response of 
capital  accumulation,  these newjobs would  further  decrease  unemploy- 
ment. One might  think  of the economy as satisfying  equation 16 in the 
short  run  but satisfying  equations  6' and 7' in the long run. 18  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1989 
Figure 4.  Labor Force Shock (f) 
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Attached  and  Unattached  Workers 
In thinking  about heterogeneity of the pool of workers, we have 
chosen to explore one dimension  that seems particularly  important  for 
short-run  dynamics-the  distinction  between attached  and unattached 
workers. A worker who is laid off may remain  attached  to the firm  in 
two distinct  senses. One is that the worker  is less available  for employ- 
ment  elsewhere  than  the typical  unemployed  worker.  The second is that 
the worker  is available  for recall by the firm  without  the need to post a 
vacancy. This practice  is most common  in manufacturing. 
We formalize  attachment  as follows. We assume that a fraction  g of 
all workers  who are laid off remain  initially  attached  to their  job. In this 
way, we draw a distinction  between the recycling of particular  jobs in 
successions of bad and good shocks, and a birth  and death process in 
which some  jobs are replaced  by others. The remaining  fraction  of laid 
off workers  (1 -  g) is unattached.  Over time, if not recalled  or hired  in Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  19 
another  job, the attached  workers  steadily  drift  away, becoming  part  of 
the pool of unattached  unemployed. 
Denote by Ua  and Un  the pool of attached  and unattached  workers, 
respectively. Leaving recalls aside, hiring  can come from both pools, 
although  perhaps  under  different  conditions:  attached  workers may be 
searching less or be more selective in their choices. The two hiring 
functions  are denoted  ma(Ua, Un,  V)  and m,(Ua,  Un, V).  The rate at 
which attached workers become unattached  is assumed, for conven- 
ience, to be the same as the quit rate from employment.  Workers  who 
quit  become unattached  upon  quitting.  The equations  of motion  are  then 
given by 
dUaldt  =  -ma-i7Ua-qUa  +  g7o(L-Ua-Un), 
dUnldt =  -mn  +  q(L -  Un) + (1 -  g)To (L -  Ua-  Un) 
dVldt =  -ma  -  M,l  +  q(L -  Ua -  Un)  -T,  (L -  Uj) 
+  aIK  -  (so  +  Tr)V. 
The number  of attached  workers  shrinks  from  new hires, recalls, and 
breakup  of attachment;  it increases  as a result  of layoffs. The number  of 
unattached  workers  shrinks  from new hires and increases as a result of 
permanent  layoffs, breakups  of attachment,  and  quits  from  employment. 
Finally  the vacancy  equation  differs  from  that  of the previous  section by 
the absence of a, Ua, since those good shocks result in a recall rather 
than  in the posting  of a vacancy. 
How will the dynamics of this extended model differ  from those of 
the minimalist  model? We shy away from a full analysis here but point 
to a number  of important  differences. 
In an economy in which workers remain highly attached to firms, 
much of the movement into and out of unemployment  will take place 
without vacancies being posted, as firms will have a pool of workers 
from which to rehire. More generally, what happens to vacancies and 
unemployment  after  a shock will depend  on the initial  stocks of attached 
and unattached  workers, which themselves will depend on the history 
of the shocks. After a sharp  but short-lived  contraction,  firms  will be 
able to increase  employment  without  relying  much  on vacancies. After 
a protracted  recession, the pool of attached  workers may have shrunk 
enough  to force  firms  to increase  employment  mostly  through  new hiring. 20  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Whether aggregate  activity shocks generate counterclockwise move- 
ments in the Beveridge  space is much more ambiguous.  An increase in 
c leads firms to recall a number of workers as well as to post new 
vacancies. Thus, in contrast to the initial model where increases in 
vacancies  are likely to lead decreases in unemployment,  unemployment 
may now decrease initially  as fast as or faster  than  vacancies increase. 
This model suggests constructing  proxies for the pools of attached 
and unattached  workers  and looking at the joint behavior  of those two 
pools and vacancies together, a suggestion  we shall not follow in this 
paper.  At the very least, however, it alerts  us to the potential  relevance 
of attached  worker  unemployment,  something  we shall  take  into  account 
in the empirical  work  below. We end the presentation  of this model  with 
two remarks. 
We would expect g, the proportion  of attached  workers,  to vary  with 
s. One reason  is that  jobs created  by reallocation  shocks are more  likely 
to be genuinely new opportunities  and therefore less likely to have 
attached  workers.  Another  is that  attachment  is likely to depend  on the 
prospects  of thejob reopening;  workers  are  less likely  to remain  attached 
to jobs that disappear permanently.  This opens another avenue for 
distinguishing  empirically  between aggregate  activity and reallocation 
shocks. 
One can think of other potentially relevant distinctions between 
groups  of workers  for which  a similar  framework  can be used. One  is the 
distinction  between those hired  from the ranks  of the unemployed  and 
those hired  from out of the labor  force; it is reasonable  to assume that 
the hiring  functions  differ  between the two groups. Another  is between 
the short-  and  the long-term  unemployed:  the issue of whether,  control- 
ling for heterogeneity, the long-term  unemployed  are less likely to be 
hired is an old one in labor economics. Our empirical  evidence in the 
next section suggests, however, that it may not be an important  distinc- 
tion from  a macroeconomic  point of view. 
The Matching Function 
Our conceptual model makes heavy use of an aggregate  matching 
function, the function  that relates the flow of new hires to the stocks of 
vacancies and unemployment.  Like the aggregate  production  function, Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  21 
the aggregate  matching  function is an abstract  but convenient device, 
which  partially  captures  a complex  reality.  In this case, the reality  is one 
of workers  looking  for the right  job, ofjobs looking  for the right  worker, 
all with varying  degrees  of intensity  and success. Changes  in the nature 
of new jobs, in the location of job creation  and  job destruction,  and in 
the search  behavior  of the unemployed  will all shift  this function.  In this 
section, we look for such a function  in the data  and  we find  it.  17 We find 
that  there  is indeed  a strong,  stable  relation  between new hires  and  both 
unemployment  and vacancies. We draw  the implications  of our  findings 
as we go along. 
New  Hires,  Vacancies,  and  Unemployment 
As we have emphasized, the labor market is highly effective in 
allocating  workers to jobs: the flows are large in proportion  to stocks; 
the average  duration  of unemployment  rarely  exceeds three  months;  the 
average  duration  of vacancies does not exceed a month. We therefore 
estimate  the matching  function  using  the highest-frequency  observations 
available,  namely monthly  data. None of the series needed to estimate 
the matching  function  is directly  available.  We construct  the three  series 
as follows (specific sources and details of construction are given in 
appendix  A). 
We construct  new hires  as the sum  of the flows into employment  from 
unemployment  and from out of the labor force, to which we add the 
estimated  flow from employment  to employment,  and from which we 
subtract  the estimated flow of workers who are recalled rather than 
newly hired. 
The flows into employment  from  unemployment  and from  out of the 
labor  force are  available  monthly  from  the Current  Population  Survey.'8 
17. Pissarides  (1986)  estimates  a matching  function  for the United  Kingdom,  with  less 
success. We have not examined  why the two sets of results  differ.  Our  specifications  are 
different.  Despite the amount  of data  construction,  our data  coverage  is broader  and  our 
data  are probably  better.  But the histories  of unemployment  in the United  Kingdom  and 
the United States over the past 15 years differ  substantially;  the matching  function  may 
not be invariant  to the history  of unemployment. 
18. More  precisely,  these flows give the number  of workers  in state i in the previous 
month  and  statej in the current  month.  A worker  who went from  out of the labor  force to 
unemployment  to employment  within  a month  would be counted  as having  moved from 
out of the labor  force  to employment. 22  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
As is well  known,  the  reported  gross  flows  are  biased  upward,  as incorrect 
classification of workers generates spurious transitions and thus in- 
creases measured  gross flows. Both Abowd and Zellner, and Poterba 
and Summers  have developed techniques  to remove the bias in the raw 
series.  '9 We use the gross flow series as adjusted  by Abowd  and  Zellner, 
which are available  from the beginning  of 1968  through  May of 1986. 
They  imply,  for  that  period,  average  monthly  flows  of 1.5  million  workers 
from  unemployment  to employment  and 1.4 million  workers  from  out of 
the labor  force to employment.20 
To those two flows, we must add the flow from employment to 
employment,  the number  of workers who quit a job for another. This 
flow has been the focus of a recent paper  by George Akerlof, Andrew 
Rose, and Janet Yellen, who review the available evidence.21 They 
conclude that  employment-to-employment  quits account  for roughly  40 
percent of all quits. There is little available evidence about the time 
series behavior  of that  proportion.  To construct  a series, we assume  that 
the proportion  of such quits is constant and equal to 0.4, and that quit 
behavior  depends  on overall  labor  market  conditions  so that  the quit  rate 
for the economy as a whole is the same  as the quit  rate  in manufacturing. 
The manufacturing  quit  rate  series is available  through  1981,  after  which 
it was discontinued.  This and the starting  date of adjusted  gross flow 
data determine  the period of estimation  below, from the beginning  of 
1968 through  the end of 1981. The employment-to-employment  flow 
series so constructed  is highly  procyclical  and  is on average  equal  to half 
the flow from  unemployment  to employment.  We investigate  below the 
robustness  of our  findings  to changes  in the construction  of the employ- 
ment-to-employment  quits series. 
19. Abowd  and  Zellner  (1985);  Poterba  and  Summers  (1986). 
20. The Poterba  and Summers  adjustments  yield a fairly  different  picture  of both the 
absolute  and  relative  sizes of these  flows. For  the  period  1977-82-for which  a comparison 
can be made-the  raw gross flows from unemployment  and out of the labor force to 
employment  are 1.8  million  and  2.8 million,  respectively.  The  Abowd-Zellner  correspond- 
ing  flows  are 1.8  million  and  1.4  million,  respectively.  The  Poterba-Summers  corresponding 
flows  are 1.4  million  and  0.4 million  only. While  these differences  between  adjusted  series 
are  disturbing,  we guess  that  to the  extent  to which  both  adjustments  are  mostly  adjustments 
of the  levels, the  two sets of series  are  likely  to have  roughly  the  same  time  series  properties. 
(This  is a guess, as the Poterba-Summers  adjusted  series  do not exist for the period  we are 
interested  in.) 
21. Akerlof,  Rose, and  Yellen  (1988). Olivier Jean Blanchard and Peter Diamond  23 
Figure  5. New Hires, Unemployment  (Adjusted),  and Vacancies,  1968-81 
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Finally, some of the hires are simply recalls of previously laid off 
workers, which do not involve the posting of vacancies.22  Temporary 
layoffs  and  recalls  are  largely  associated  with  the presence  of unions  and 
appear to be much less important  outside of manufacturing.  In the 
absence of hard  data, we assume that aggregate  recalls are equal to 1.5 
times  manufacturing  recalls.  The recall  series so constructed  has a mean 
of 0.2 million workers during 1968-81. We also investigate below the 
robustness  of our  findings  to changes  in the scale parameter. 
We use seasonally adjusted  series for manufacturing  and deseason- 
alize gross  flows, which show large  stochastic  seasonality,  by frequency 
domain  filtering.23  The resulting  new hires series is plotted in figure  5, 
along with our measures of unemployment  and vacancies described 
22. The  importance  of such  recalls  in total  hires  in manufacturing,  first  emphasized  by 
Feldstein  (1975),  was studied  in more  detail  by David  Lilien  (1980). 
23. See Sims  (1974). 24  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
below. One obvious characteristic  of the new hires series is its large 
high-frequency  movements,  which in turn  come from  the movements  in 
the CPS  gross  flow series. We  believe  that  these movements  come largely 
from sampling  and classification  error:  the Abowd-Zellner  adjustment 
removes the mean error but not its random  component. If this is the 
case, the series  can  still  be used  as a left-hand  side  variable  in  a regression. 
The composition of the gross flow into employment shows clearly 
that  the  relevant  pool of workers  includes  more  thanjust  the  unemployed. 
By using unemployment  in most of what follows, we implicitly  assume 
that  the relevant  pool is proportional  to the pool of unemployed  workers. 
We take the pool of unemployment  as being  equal  to the total number  of 
unemployed  workers  minus those workers  classified as "job losers on 
layoff," workers  who consider themselves as having a job. The mean 
unemployment  rate so defined  is 4.8 percent  for the period 1968  through 
1981. We also explore alternative  definitions  of the pool as a weighted 
sum including  job losers on layoff, as well as some of the workers 
classified  as out of the labor  force. In particular,  we consider  the role of 
those workers  who indicate  that, while they are not searching  for work, 
they would  take ajob if offered. 
Finally, it is well known that there exists no continuous aggregate 
vacancy series in the United States. We use the help-wanted series 
constructed  by the Conference  Board  and  adjust  it following  Abraham.24 
The mean  of the vacancy  rate series so constructed  is 2.2 percent  during 
1968-81. 
The use of this adjusted  help-wanted  series raises two issues. The 
first  is whether  this adjusted  series closely tracks vacancies. The work 
of Abraham  suggests that it does; in particular  for those subperiods  for 
which a vacancy measure exists, both series appear to have similar 
cyclical behavior  and proportional  movements of the same amplitude. 
The second is whether vacancies are a useful series at all. There is 
evidence that some vacancies do not correspond  to actual  jobs and that 
some  jobs exist for which no vacancy is posted. But the same is true of 
24. More specifically,  we adjust  the series for trend  changes  in the relation  between 
the help-wanted  index  and  vacancies,  using  and  extrapolating  a quadratic  trend  estimated 
on the adjustment  factor  in table  A-1 of Abraham  (1987).  We adjust  the level of the series 
so that its mean  is similar  to the mean  reported  vacancy  rate for the periods  of time for 
which such a rate  is available;  see Abraham  (1983,  table  3). For a description  of the help- 
wanted  index  itself, see Preston  (1977). Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  25 
unemployment:  some unemployed  are not really looking  for work, and 
many  people classified  as out of the labor  force are in fact available  for 
work. More to the point, the proof of the pudding  is that regressions 
using vacancies as an explanatory  variable  show that vacancies are an 
important  determinant  of wages, at least as important  as unemploy- 
ment.25  Our  results  below  find  that  vacancies  are  an  essential  determinant 
of new hires;  at the same  time, the significance  of unemployment  implies 
that  vacancies are not simply  a mirror  image  of new hires. 
The Aggregate  Matching Function:  Basic  Specifications 
Our  basic specification  gives new hires as a Cobb-Douglas  function 
of vacancies and  unemployment,  with all variables  defined  as above: 
(17)  ln(Ht)  =  ao +  al time +  a2ln(Vt_1)  +  a3 ln(U_-1)  +  e,. 
There is no clean way of handling timing. First, our model is in 
continuous  time, and  we have discrete  time  data.  With  the mean  duration 
of vacancies under  a month, a literal  interpretation  of an equation  such 
as equation 17  would make no sense as the flow of new hires during  the 
month  exceeds the total number  of vacancies at any time. Insofar  as the 
discrete  time specification  works  empirically,  it relies  on the smoothness 
of the continuous  time pattern  of vacancies. Second, while one would 
want  to regress  new hires  during  the month  on the two stocks at the same 
time of the month, the data do not come in that form. The new hires 
number  for time t corresponds  roughly,  however, to the integral  of the 
flow from the middle of month (t -  1) to the middle of month t. The 
vacancy number  for time t is the integral  of the stocks of help-wanted 
ads over month  t. The unemployment  number  measures  unemployment 
in the middle  of the month. Our  specification  is a compromise.  We also 
present the results of  estimation with current values of  V and U, 
instrumented  by their  lagged  values. 
The results are presented  in table 1. We first  discuss regressions 1 to 
11.  Regression  1  estimates  equation  17  by ordinary  least squares  (OLS). 
Regression  2 imposes constant returns  to scale-that  is, a2 +  a3 =  1. 
Regression  3 allows for the elasticity  of substitution  between V and U to 
25. See, for  example,  Brownlie  and  Hampton  (1967);  Schultze  (1971);  Baily  and  Tobin 
(1977);  Abraham  and  Medoff  (1984);  Jackman,  Layard,  and  Pissarides  (1984)  for  European 
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differ  from  one, by estimating  a constant  elasticity  of substitution  (CES) 
instead of a Cobb-Douglas  specification.  Regression  4 allows for first- 
order serial correlation  in the disturbance  term. Regression 5 checks 
robustness to timing  assumptions  by using current  values of V and U, 
instrumented  by their  lagged  values. Regressions  6 and 7 check robust- 
ness to changes  in our construction  of the new hire series. In regression 
6 we assume that employment-to-employment  quits represent  only 20 
percent  of all quits, and  in regression  7 we assume that  aggregate  recalls 
are equal to twice the recalls in manufacturing.  We have experimented 
with more  general  assumptions  about  the proportion  of employment-to- 
employment  quits, allowing them to be procyclical, and found results 
similar  to those reported  in regression 6. We have also experimented 
with more  generous  lag structures,  but have found no evidence in favor 
of  further lags of  unemployment or vacancies.26  Finally, we  have 
searched for nonlinearities;  we have explored the idea that, as unem- 
ployment increases, firms  find workers as easily as they want, so that 
further  increases in the unemployment  rate, given vacancies, do not 
increase hiring. Allowing for additional  nonlinear  terms in unemploy- 
ment,  or splitting  the sample  according  to the  value  of the  unemployment- 
vacancy ratio, we could find  no evidence of such an effect. 
The set of regressions  1-7 is potentially  subject  to a simultaneity  bias. 
Despite the fact that  the estimated  disturbance  term  in those regressions 
is slightly  negatively  correlated,  it may be the sum  of a large, negatively 
serially  correlated  measurement  error  and  a positively  serially  correlated 
disturbance  term standing  for omitted  factors in the hiring  function. In 
this case, the estimated coefficients on vacancies and unemployment 
are likely to be biased downwards  as a positive disturbance  to hiring 
leads, other things being equal, to a decrease in unemployment  and 
vacancies in the following month, thus a negative correlation  between 
the hiring  disturbance  and  both  unemployment  and  vacancies. Thus, the 
next four regressions  estimate equation  17  using instrumental  variables 
(IV). There are no obvious available  instruments,  and we use different 
26. There is direct evidence that vacancies are often for jobs that do not start until 
later,  for  example  at the start  of the new work  season;  see Myers  and  Creamer  (1967).  This 
is especially  true  ofjobs in education.  This,  however,  is likely  to affect  the  relation  between 
seasonal  components  of those variables  that  we do not look at; we find  no evidence  in the 
deseasonalized  data  of the positive  distributed-lag  relation  that  such  behavior,  if true  also 
at nonseasonal  frequencies, would imply. The only lagged variable  that is sometimes 
marginally  significant  is vacancies  lagged  twice, but  with  a negative  coefficient. Olivier Jean Blanchard and Peter Diamond  29 
sets that are likely to reduce but not eliminate  the bias. Regression 8 
uses further  lagged  values  of Uand V. Regressions  9 and 10  use industrial 
production, lagged one to four times and lagged two to five times, 
respectively: to the extent that firms vary hours to compensate for 
disturbances  in hiring, industrial  production  may be affected less by 
disturbances  to the matching  function than is either unemployment  or 
vacancies. Finally,  regression  11  uses a variable  that  is constructed  later 
in the paper,  the component  of unemployment  due to shifts in aggregate 
activity; this component is  conceptually independent of  stochastic 
movements  in the hiring  function  and  is thus an appropriate  instrument. 
We see the main  results of those regressions  as being the following. 
Both unemployment  and vacancies matter  in hiring.  The rate of hiring 
appears  to be determined  by both sides of the labor  market,  not only by 
the demand side, as is often assumed in macroeconomic  models. The 
average  duration  of vacancies appears  to vary with the vacancy-unem- 
ployment  ratio. The adjusted  unemployment-vacancy  ratio varies over 
that  period  between 5.0 and  0.9. With  the ratio  equal  to 5.0, the average 
duration  of vacancies is, using regression  2, two weeks; when the ratio 
equals  0.9, the average  duration  of vacancies increases  to four  weeks.27 
While the average duration  of vacancies is shorter  than that of unem- 
ployment-something we knew from the average vacancy-unemploy- 
ment  ratio-it varies  substantially  in  the  cycle. Just  as forunemployment, 
the  average  duration  also  hides  differences  in  durations  across  vacancies; 
a 1964  Rochester  study found that, while the median  duration  was four 
weeks, more than 40 percent of vacancies lasted more than six weeks 
and  20 percent  longer  than  twelve weeks.28 
The evidence suggests  constant  or mildly  increasing  returns  to scale. 
Recent theoretical  developments have argued  for the plausibility  and 
the potential  importance  for macroeconomics  of increasing  returns  in 
matching.29  Plausibility  of increasing  returns  comes from the idea that 
27. The average  duration  of a vacancy  is given by VIH.  Thus, if the hiring  function  is 
of  the  form H  =  AVaUI  the  average  duration is  given  by A'  (V/U)'  One can 
obviously  compute  the average  duration  of unemployment  as well. The  two corresponding 
numbers  are  2.3 and  0.8 months.  But  as unemployment  proxies  for  a larger  pool  of workers, 
these numbers  are  misleading. 
28. For the Rochester study, see Myers and Creamer  (1967). If the arrival  rate of 
workers  were  constant,  a median  duration  of vacancies  of four  weeks would  imply  a mean 
of 5.77  weeks; 35 percent  of vacancies  would  last more  than  six weeks. 
29. See Diamond  (1982). 30  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1989 
active, "thick" markets  may lead to easier matches, with or without 
more intensive search. Our regressions yield an estimated degree of 
returns  to scale that  is roughly  equal  to one when no instrument  is used, 
but reaches 1.35 when lagged industrial production is  used as  an 
instrument. (Further lagging industrial production does  not further 
increase  the estimate.)  As mentioned  earlier,  some downward  bias may 
remain  so that proponents  of strongly  increasing  returns  may still have 
hope.30  At the same time, however, the estimated  time trend  associated 
with the estimate of  1.35 implies a decrease in the effectiveness of 
matching of 42 percent over the period 1968-81-at  given levels of 
unemployment and vacancies-a  decrease we  find too large to be 
plausible.  One  way  of restoring  plausibility  is to assume  long-run  constant 
returns  but short-run  increasing  returns.  With a Cobb-Douglas  formu- 
lation, the equations  as reported  can be interpreted  in this way. Let Ut 
and Vt  be trend  levels of the variables.  Write  new hires as 
ln(Ht)  =  aO  +  a,time  +  a2ln(Vt-I/Vt-1) 
+  a3 ln (Ut1I / Ut_1) +  b ln  VtI 
+ (1 -  b)  ln Ut_-  +  et. 
Thus there is long-run  constant returns without restricting  short-run 
returns.  With  the economy showing  exponential  trend  growth  at rate  n, 
the regression  coefficient  on time is equal  to a, -  (a2  + a3 -  1)  n. Setting 
n equal to the monthly growth rate of employment over the period, 
0.0018, the coefficient on time  implied by equation 10 in table 1 is 
- 0.0027, midway  between the values in equations  2 and 10  without  the 
modified  interpretation. 
All specifications  yield a trend  decline in hires given unemployment 
and vacancies. According,  for example, to regression  2, the decline is 
roughly 25 percent over the sample period. The decline suggests a 
potential  proximate  source  for the shift  in the Beveridge  curve, an issue 
to which we shall  return.  The source of this trend  decline, however, we 
do not investigate  further. 
The last two regressions  of the table, regressions 12  and 13, use new 
hires  in manufacturing,  or  more  precisely  the hiring  rate  in manufacturing 
30. Moreover,  the different  structures  of trade  in the output  and  labor  markets  leave 
open the question  of returns  to scale in the market  for consumer  goods. Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  31 
times aggregate  employment, instead of aggregate  new hires, as the 
dependent  variable.  This  regression  was first  run  by Malcolm  Cohen  and 
Robert  Solow, with vacancies as the dependent  variable.31  The reason 
for running  this regression  is that the manufacturing  new hires series is 
a cleaner  series  than  our  constructed  series;  the trade-off  is that  the right- 
hand  side variables  are for the economy as a whole, which is much  less 
cyclical than manufacturing.  Regression 12 estimates the equation 
without  instrumenting;  regression  13  uses industrial  production,  lagged 
two to five times, as an instrument.  The results for the two are sharply 
different  from the earlier  ones and from each other. Estimated  returns 
to scale are roughly  constant  in regression 12 but sharply  increasing  in 
regression  13. The estimated  degree  of returns  to scale of 1.83  in the last 
regression is, however, associated with an estimated time trend that 
implies a decrease in effectiveness of matching  of 72 percent over the 
estimation  period  at given unemployment  and vacancies, again  a highly 
implausible  value without further  modification  of the model. One can 
also dismiss the findings  of strongly increasing  returns  as a result of 
misspecification,  because the right-hand  side variables  correspond  to 
the aggregate  economy and manufacturing  hires move relatively  much 
more  than aggregate  hires. The other result  is that, in both regressions, 
vacancies dominate  unemployment.  Again, one can easily dismiss that 
result as coming from inappropriate  right-hand  side variables.32  We 
report  it because it opens the interesting  possibility  that manufacturing 
is different  from the rest of the economy, with firms  in manufacturing 
having  little  trouble  in  recruiting  workers.  This  dual  view of labor  markets 
has recently  been reexplored  using  efficiency  wage theories.33 
The Aggregate  Matching  Function:  The Relevant  Pool  of  Workers 
Table 1 has maintained  the assumption that the relevant pool of 
workers  is proportional  to total unemployment  minus  layoff unemploy- 
31. Cohen  and  Solow (1967). 
32. For  example,  the fact that  vacancies  move less than  true  manufacturing  vacancies 
does not allow  that series to explain  the negative  correlation  between  unemployment  and 
hires found in the data. Thus, the coefficient on unemployment  is likely to be biased 
downwards. 
33. Bulow  and  Summers  (1986),  for example. 32  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
ment. Table 2 explores alternative  definitions  of the pool. The first  five 
regressions  assume  a relation  of the form 
(18)  ln(Ht)  =  ao +  a,  time  +  a2 ln (Vt -) 
+  (1  -  a2)In(XI,t  -  +  a3X2,t-1)  +  Et, 
where  XI and  X2  denote two components  of the pool and  are assumed  to 
be perfect  substitutes  up to a scale parameter  a3.  All regressions  assume 
constant  returns  to scale. 
None of the regressions  yields precise estimates of the composition 
of the pool. The point estimates  are nevertheless  interesting. 
The first  regression  examines  the role of those unemployed  classified 
as job losers on layoff. The point estimate of a3  is 9 percent, suggesting 
that some of those workers are also looking for jobs.34  The second 
regression  examines  the role of those classified  as out of the labor  force 
but who indicate that, while they are not looking, they "want a job 
now"; this group  is roughly  the same size as those classified  as unem- 
ployed. That the series is available only quarterly  and needs to be 
interpolated  probably  reduces  its usefulness  in monthly  regressions.  The 
estimated scale coefficient on this group is 54 percent, confirming  the 
evidence  from  the flow data  that  many  in this  group  are  indistinguishable 
from the unemployed.  The next regression, which uses the series for 
those classified  as out of the labor  force, yields essentially a zero scale 
parameter. 
Regressions  4 and  5 consider  the separate  roles of the short-term  (less 
than 27 weeks) and long-term  unemployed. The first set of results is 
surprising,  finding  a scale parameter  on the long-term  unemployed  in 
excess of unity. One tentative  explanation  is that long-term  unemploy- 
ment  is a better  proxy  for the pool of workers  out of the labor  force, and 
thus has a coefficient  that is biased upwards.  Regression  5 attempts  to 
control  for that  by allowing  for short-term  and  long-term  unemployment 
and for workers out of the labor force who want a job.  Long-term 
unemployment  still has a scale coefficient that exceeds one. Thus the 
34. Katz  and  Meyer  (1987)  find  that  workers  not  expecting  to be recalled  spend  roughly 
twice as much  time  searching  as those expecting  to be recalled.  The study,  however,  gives 
no direct  information  as to their  respective  reservation  wages. I  ~  ~~~~  ~  ~ ~  N  0 
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evidence, while statistically  weak, does not suggest  that short-term  and 
long-term  unemployed  enter  the matching  function  differently.35 
As we can decompose new hires by origin  (unemployment,  employ- 
ment, and out of the labor  force), we could in principle  estimate  a set of 
hiring  functions  relating  each of the flows to the stocks. The  poor quality 
of our  proxies  for the stocks other  than  unemployment  prevents  us from 
going too far in that direction. Regressions 6 and 7 present a simple 
attempt at estimation. We assume that the unemployed and those 
workers out of the labor  force who want a job are perfect substitutes, 
and that flows of new hires are proportional  to the relative sizes of the 
two pools. 
Let HU and HN be hirings  from unemployment  and from out of the 
labor  force, respectively.  Let U be the pool of unemployed  workers  and 
N be the pool of workers  out of the labor  force who want  ajob, the series 
we introduced  earlier.  We estimate  the following  two relations: 
(19)  ln(Hut) =  ln[Ut- ll(Ut- I + Nt- 1)] +  ao +  a, time +  a2ln(Vt  1) 
+  a3ln(Ut-I  +  Nt-1)  +  Et, 
(20)  ln(HNt) =  ln[Nt-Il(Ut-I  +  Nt-1)]  +  ao +  al time +  a2ln(Vt  1) 
+  a3ln(Ut- 1 +  Nt_1)  +  Et. 
If our assumptions  were correct, the two regressions  should  give the 
same estimated  parameters.  The role of vacancies appears, however, 
stronger  for the hires  from  out of the labor  force than  for the hires out of 
unemployment. 
35. Katz (1986)  finds no evidence of a declining  job-finding  hazard  once the recall 
hazard  is taken into account. However, the relation  between time series results and 
microeconomic  cross-section  results  on duration  dependence  is a complex  one. One  may 
find  duration  dependence  at the individual  level but not at the macroeconomic  level if, for 
example,  firms  hire  the short-term  unemployed  first.  On the other  hand,  one may  find  no 
duration  dependence  at the individual  level, but find  it at the macroeconomic  level if the 
unemployed  are heterogeneous, with the long-term  unemployed  containing  a higher 
proportion  of unemployable  workers.  Axell and Lang  (1988)  have shown  that  there  is no 
necessary  relation  between  cross-section  and  aggregate  comparative  statics  results. 
The evidence appears  quite different  in the United Kingdom,  which has had a very 
different  history of unemployment.  See, for example, Jackman  and Layard  (1988);  and 
Budd  and  others  (1988). Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  35 
Using  the Estimated  Function  in the Minimalist Model 
Having  estimated  the aggregate  matching  function,  we now return  to 
the minimalist  model  of the economy to examine  its implications  for the 
behavior  of a model economy. After selecting  all the parameters  for the 
model, we calculate steady states for alternative  levels of aggregate 
activity, c. If c follows a determinate  sine wave, it generates counter- 
clockwise loops around  the steady-state locus. The size of the loops 
indicates the difference  that comes from integrating  dynamics  into the 
analysis instead of considering  only steady states. Since the estimated 
matching  function has a negative time trend, we then contrast cycles 
with parameters  from  early  and  late in the estimation  period. 
We take the matching  function to be Cobb-Douglas,  with constant 
returns and coefficient 0.4 on unemployment. We choose the scale 
parameter,  A, which captures the constant plus the time trend in the 
estimated  equation, to range from 1.30 at the beginning  to 0.95 at the 
end. For q, the rate of quits (remembering  that only quits that are 
replaced  are relevant),  we choose 0.01, which  is the minimum  manufac- 
turing  quit rate in the period. The other parameters  are then chosen to 
approximate  sample  averages  for unemployment,  vacancies, and mean 
hires. This leads to choices of 1.05 for (KIL),  the ratio of potential  jobs 
to workers;  0.023 for s, the reallocation  parameter;  and 0.925 for c, the 
potential  activity level. These values imply, in turn, an arrival  rate of 
good profitability  shocks, ,rr,  of 0.307 and an arrival  rate of bad profit- 
ability  shocks, rrO,  of 0.025. For steady-state  loci, we let c vary  between 
0.88 and  0.97. To trace  out a cycle, we let c be a sine wave between 0.90 
and  0.95, with a period  of five years. 
In figure  6, we show the time paths of new hires, H, unemployment, 
and  vacancies  when  A was equal  to 1.  1, representing  the midpoint  of our 
observation  period. This figure  can be compared  with figure  5, which 
gives the observed  time series. As with that  figure,  changes  in vacancies 
show a small  lead over changes in unemployment.  In figure  7, we plot 
both  the steady-state  loci and  the cycles of Uand Vfor  the  two  parameters 
A  =  0.95  and A  =  1.3. The cycles  are counterclockwise  around the 
steady-state  loci. As can be seen from  the figure,  the diagonal  shift  in the 
steady-state  locus corresponds  to an increase  of roughly  1  percent  in the 
unemployment  rate. In contrast with this relatively small move, the 
small slope of the steady-state locus implies a much larger  horizontal 36  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Figure 6.  New Hires, Unemployment, and Vacancies Relative to the Labor Force, One 
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distance between the curves. The results show that the decrease in the 
productivity  of the matching  function is not very important  if c ranges 
over the same values. However, if c is adjusted  so that vacancies range 
over the same values, the decline in the matching  function  generates  a 
large increase in unemployment.  We return  to these issues when dis- 
cussing  the shift  in the Beveridge  relation  later  on. 
This ends our discussion of the matching  function.  The other central 
element of our approach  is our assumption  that the economy is contin- 
uously subject to large  flows of job creation  and destruction.  One may 
think-and  we did-of  using the evidence from gross flows of workers 
both at the aggregate  level and in manufacturing  to get at those flows. 
But these flows do not contain the evidence needed to get at those 
numbers. To take an example, our simple model implies that job 
terminations  are equal to job separations  minus quits because in the Olivier Jean  Blanchard and Peter Diamond  37 
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model  all quits  are replaced.  In actuality,  quits are also used by firms  to 
reduce  their  labor  force, and  not all quits  are  replaced.  Thus,  an estimate 
of job creations  must  embody  assumptions  as to the proportion  of quits 
that  is replaced.  A more  promising  approach,  to look at  jobs directly, at 
employment  changes  by establishment,  was followed recently  by Davis 
and Haltiwanger,  extending earlier work by Leonard.36  Their study, 
which constructs  a quarterly  time series for 1979  to 1983,  suggests that 
job creations  are indeed large and slightly  procyclical,  job destructions 
large and countercyclical.  We have not explored the relation of their 
results to our approach  further.  In the last section, we use an indirect 
approach  and use instead stock data to identify the importance  and 
dynamic  effects of cyclical, reallocation,  and  labor  supply  shocks. 
36.  Davis and Haltiwanger (1989); Leonard (1988). 38  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
The Joint Behavior of the Labor Force, Unemployment, 
and Vacancies 
We now return to the Beveridge relation. The relation between 
monthly unemployment  and vacancy rates in the United States from 
1952  through 1988, using the same measure  of vacancies as earlier, is 
plotted in figure  8. The relation  has two clear features. The first is the 
large  thin  loops around  a downward-sloping  locus. The other  is the well- 
documented  shift to the right  over the postwar period.37  Interestingly, 
the shift has substantially  reversed over the past four years: from the 
last month  in 1984  through  1988,  the vacancy rate  has remained  roughly 
constant, while the unemployment  rate has decreased  2 percent. 
Our  earlier  analysis suggests a simple interpretation  of those move- 
ments: the large  loops suggest that aggregate  activity shocks dominate 
short-  and medium-run  movements  in unemployment.  The shifts to the 
right  and  more  recently  to the  left suggest  a role  for  changes  in  reallocation 
intensity  or effectiveness, but over longer  periods. This visual interpre- 
tation, however, can go only so far. It does not allow us to quantify  the 
relative importance  of the different  shocks, nor does it clearly charac- 
terize  the  dynamic  effects of the shocks  on unemployment  and  vacancies. 
If there are more than two main sources of shocks, if, for example, 
shocks  to the  labor  force  are  also important,  the visual  approach  becomes 
potentially  misleading.  What  this section does, therefore, is develop a 
simple but formal statistical interpretation  of the data, which largely 
confirms  and extends the initial  visual  impression. 
The statistical  approach  is conceptually  simple.  A precise  description 
is given in the appendix, but the logic underlying  the various steps is 
easy to lay out. 
From our theoretical  analysis, we think of movements in the labor 
force, unemployment, and vacancies as coming from their dynamic 
responses  to three  types of shocks: shocks to aggregate  activity, shocks 
to reallocation,  and shocks to the labor  force. Using the same notation 
as in the theoretical  section, we denote the three variables  by L, U, and 
V, respectively, and the three shocks by c, s, andf. These shocks are 
not observable  and are likely to be serially  correlated.  We denote their 
37. Abraham  and  Medoff  (1982),  for example. Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  39 
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innovations-the  white noise residuals that one would obtain from a 
regression of those shocks on their lagged values, were those shocks 
observable-by  Ec, E,, and  Ef.  Thus, putting  the two sources of dynamics 
together,  we can think  of the movements  in L, U, and V as coming  from 
the dynamic effects of the three innovations,  Ec, E,, and Ef. 
We then estimate  the dynamic  process characterizing  the  joint move- 
ments of L, U, and V, using monthly  data from 1952  through  1988,  by 
means  of a vector autoregression.  We use the labor  force and  unemploy- 
ment series from the household survey, and use for vacancies the 
adjusted  help-wanted  series  described  in  the  previous  section.  The  vector 
autoregression  gives L, U, and V as functions  of their  lagged  values and 
of three reduced-form,  white noise innovations-the  monthly move- 
ments in L,  U,  and V that cannot be predicted from lagged values. 
Denote the three  reduced-form  innovations  by 1,  u, and v, respectively. 
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combinations  of the  's. That is, the unexplained  movement in unem- 
ployment  during  a month  comes from  innovations  in aggregate  activity, 
from  innovations  in the intensity  of reallocation,  or from  innovations  in 
the labor  force. If we knew those linear  combinations,  we could go from 
1, u, and v back to the E's  and characterize  the dynamic  effects of each 
of the E's on L, U, and V. The data do not, however, tell us anything 
about  those linear  combinations.  Thus, to recover them, we must make 
identification  assumptions.  We make  the following  assumptions. 
First, we assume that  the three innovations  Ef,  Es,  and E are uncorre- 
lated. One can think  of many reasons why this may not be exactly the 
case, but we believe it to be an acceptable  approximation.  The assump- 
tion of zero correlation  between aggregate activity and reallocation 
innovations  requires  some discussion. Consider,  for example, changes 
in the price of oil. An oil price increase may well lead to a positive 
realization  of Es (more  required  reallocation)  and a negative value of Ec 
(an aggregate  demand  contraction  through  income effects); but, sym- 
metrically,  an  oil price  decrease  also corresponds  to a positive  realization 
of Es (more required  reallocation)  and a positive realization  of Ec (an 
aggregate  demand  expansion through  the same income effects). Thus, 
oil price shocks lead to a zero correlation  between c and s. A similar 
argument  also holds if, for example, changes in aggregate  activity lead 
to larger  required  reallocation.  But one can also think  of counterexam- 
ples. Increases in reallocation  may be systematically  associated with 
scrapping  of old equipment and surges of investment, leading to a 
positive correlation  between E and  Ec. 
Second, we assume that Ec affects unemployment  and vacancies in 
opposite directions  for at least n months  and that E affects them in the 
same  direction  for at least n months.  We choose n to be 9; results  are  not 
very sensitive to the exact choice of n, say between 5 and 10 months. 
These assumptions  in effect define  E and E, and it is important  to note 
that  these are more  general  definitions  than  those used in our  theoretical 
model. For example, the definition of  Es is consistent with positive 
reallocation  shocks first leading to job destruction  and an increase in 
unemployment,  and leading  only over time to the creation  of new jobs 
and the posting of vacancies. The definition of Ec is consistent with 
negative changes in aggregate activity leading first to a decrease in 
vacancies, then to layoffs, and so on. 
Third,  we assume that innovations  in the labor  force respond  only to Olivier Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  41 
innovations  in employment.  One important  characteristic  of the data is 
that the correlation between reduced-form  innovations in monthly 
employment  and  labor  force is equal  to 0.8, a very high  value. As for any 
correlation  coefficient, this may reflect  causality  running  from employ- 
ment  to the labor  force, or from  the labor  force to employment,  or both. 
As we saw when we looked at flows earlier,  an increase  in employment 
draws people directly from out of the labor force into employment. It 
probably  induces  others  who were also out of the labor  force to become 
unemployed.  An increase  in the labor  force may, however, also lead to 
an increase in employment: some jobs may be created because new 
workers enter, or suppressed as workers leave the labor force. We 
assume  the parameter  giving  the contemporaneous  effect of an employ- 
ment  innovation  on the labor  force to be equal  to 0.5. (Results  are nearly 
invariant  to values of this parameter  between 0.3 and  0.6.) This implies, 
in turn,  an effect of labor  force innovations  on employment  equal  to 0.4. 
This  assumption  allows us to identify  the labor  supply  innovation  as that 
part of the labor force innovation that is not due to a response to 
employment. 
These assumptions  allow us to narrow  down very tightly  the class of 
linear  combinations  consistent  with the data. We choose one such set of 
linear  combinations.  Having  done so, we recover  the innovations  in each 
of the three shocks and  derive the dynamic  effects of these innovations. 
We now turn  to those dynamic  effects. 
Dynamic Effects of Innovations in f,  s, and c 
Figure  9 gives impulse  responses-that is, the dynamic  effects of one- 
standard-deviation  innovations  in each of the three shocks on the labor 
force, vacancies, and unemployment  for the first three years-for  the 
benchmark  case, defined in appendix B, together with one-standard- 
deviation  bands, from a Monte Carlo  simulation.38  Tables 3 and 4 give 
long-run  impulse  responses  and  variance  decompositions  for the bench- 
mark  case. 
38. Available  from  the authors  upon  request  are  copies of figures  that  show the effects 
of alternative  identification  conditions.  The  figures  make  the  point  graphically  that  plausible 
variations  do not change  the dynamic  responses  very much.  Thus,  we concentrate  on the 
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Table 3.  Impulse Responsesa 
L  V  U 
Shock  Months  (x  1-2)  (X  10-3)  (X  10-2) 
Long-run  impulse  responsesb 
Ef  1  0.30  -0.05  0.11 
100  0.30  0.08  0.05 
200  0.34  0.10  0.03 
E,  1  0.04  0.53  -  0.07 
100  0.04  0.02  -  0.02 
200  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
E  1  -0.01  0.05  0.13 
100  0.23  0.05  0.07 
200  0.36  0.09  0.05 
a.  Identification assuming  0  =  0.4,  ot =  2.2; 0 and ot are defined in Appendix  B. 
b.  Impulse responses  for the first 36 months are plotted in figure 9. 
Table 4.  Variance Decompositionsa 
Variable  Months  Ef  E,  es 
Proportion  of variance  due to shock 
L  1  0.89  0.02  0.08 
36  0.75  0.17  0.07 
100  0.68  0.08  0.22 
200  0.58  0.02  0.39 
V  1  0.01  0.97  0.01 
36  0.06  0.86  0.07 
100  0.07  0.85  0.07 
200  0.10  0.80  0.09 
U  1  0.33  0.13  0.53 
36  0.04  0.86  0.09 
100  0.11  0.61  0.26 
200  0.14  0.49  0.36 
a.  Identification assuming 0  =  0.4,  ot =  2.2. 
Overall, the qualitative dynamic effects are consistent with the 
predictions  of the formal  model. This has to remain  a vague statement, 
given that  all we observe is a convolution  of the lag structure  implied  by 
the model  and  the lag structure  of the shocks. Without  some restrictions 
on the  joint process of the shocks, such as the assumption  that  the three 
shocks  are  uncorrelated  at all  leads  and  lags, any set of estimated  impulse 
responses is a priori  consistent with the model. In our interpretation  of 
the results below, we make indeed  this implicit  restriction.  From  figure 44  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
9, which  spans  the  first  three  years  after  a shock, we see the main  features 
of the results  as being  the following. 
The effects of labor  supply  innovations,  Ef,  on the labor  force quickly 
decrease to about two-thirds  of the initial  impact, and then stabilize at 
that  level. This is suggestive  of two components:  one, new entrants  who 
come in and stay and, the other, workers  with marginal  attachment  who 
go in and out of the labor  force. The effect on unemployment  dies out 
within  a year:  the increase  in the labor  force has by then translated  into 
an increase in employment. The short-run dynamic response thus 
appears consistent with the predictions of equation 16, the model in 
which capital  is fixed; the longer-run  response appears  consistent with 
the predictions  of the model composed of equations  6' and 7', in which 
the number  ofjobs moves with changes  in the labor  force. 
Positive  aggregate  activity  innovations,  E,,  lead  to a sustained  increase 
in vacancies and a sustained  decrease in unemployment,  as well as an 
increase  in the labor  force. The effects on unemployment  and  vacancies 
are hump-shaped,  peaking  within  less than  a year, and  all but  disappear- 
ing after three years. Vacancies peak one or two months  before unem- 
ployment  bottoms out. While  aggregate  activity shocks have negligible 
long-run  effects on unemployment  or vacancies, they have a long-run 
effect on the labor force, an effect not predicted  by our analysis and 
suggestive  of hysteretic  effects of changes  in activity on participation. 
Positive reallocation  innovations,  Es,  lead-by  construction-to  in- 
creases in both unemployment  and  vacancies. But their  dynamic  effects 
differ  from  those predicted  by our  theoretical  analysis  in  two ways. First, 
the increase in unemployment  precedes the increase in vacancies. The 
increase  in  unemployment  is highestjust  after  the shock, while  vacancies 
increase to peak after  roughly  a year. This suggests a process in which 
higher  reallocation  intensity  leads first  to the loss ofjobs, followed only 
over time by the creation  of new jobs, a plausible  dynamic  process but 
one we did not build  in our  model. Second, while the initial  effects of an 
increase in reallocation intensity are to increase unemployment  and 
decrease the labor  force, the effect on the labor  force becomes positive 
in the medium and long run; a tentative explanation  is again that of 
hysteretic effects of shocks on participation.  Most of those who lose 
their  jobs remain  in the labor  force, while new  jobs, which may appear 
in new locations, draw  in new workers. 
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largely dominate fluctuations  in unemployment  and vacancies. This 
picture  is sharpened  in tables  3 and  4. While  long-run  impulse  responses 
are imprecisely  estimated,  the results in table 3 are, taken  at face value, 
interesting.  The effects of aggregate  activity innovations,  while large  in 
the short  and medium  run, disappear  nearly  completely  in the long run. 
In contrast, both reallocation  and labor force shocks appear to have 
long-run  effects on unemployment  and vacancies. This suggests that 
nonstationarity  in the three series is due to the long-run  effects of labor 
force and reallocation shocks rather than to the long-run effects of 
aggregate activity shocks.39 
Even if aggregate  activity shocks have no long-run  effect, variance 
decompositions  in table  4 show, however, that, given their  contribution 
to short-  and  medium-run  movements,  aggregate  activity  shocks  account 
for a very large proportion  of movements in both unemployment  and 
vacancies at all horizons. The proportion  is smaller  for unemployment 
at short  horizons, where labor  force and reallocation  shocks are impor- 
tant.  The proportion  also declines slowly with the horizon,  reflecting  the 
small  long-run  effect of aggregate  activity shocks described  earlier,  but 
remains  large  even after 18  years. 
Back to the Beveridge  Curve 
We can now return  to the familiar  Beveridge curve representation 
and decompose the movements in the unemployment  and the vacancy 
rates  into  the  movements  due  to labor  supply,  reallocation,  and  aggregate 
activity shocks. We do this in figures  10  and 11. Figure 10  gives the loci 
traced by the unemployment  rate, UR, and the vacancy rate, VR, for 
the first  60  months  following  a one-standard-deviation  innovation  in each 
of the shocks.40  Figure 11 decomposes the historical  movements  in the 
Beveridge curve into the components due to each of the three shocks 
and  a deterministic  component,  the movement  in UR  and VR  that  would 
have occurred, had all realizations  of shocks been identically  equal to 
39. If aggregate  activity innovations  truly  had no effect on the variables  in the long 
run,  this would  imply  the existence  of one cointegrating  vector  across  the three  variables. 
As we see in Appendix  B, however, there  is no evidence that such a vector exists in the 
data. 
40. Figure  10  contains  exactly the same  information  as figure  9. It is just another  way 
of looking  at the dynamics  of unemployment,  vacancies,  and  the labor  force. 46  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Figure 10.  Effects of Aggregate Activity, Reallocation, and Labor Force Shocks 
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zero during  the period. (While  we do not allow for a time trend when 
doing estimation, the system will exhibit time trends if some of the 
estimated  roots are very close to unity, and the constant terms of the 
regressions  are different  from zero.) From these figures, we draw  two 
sets of conclusions. 
In the short  and medium  run, aggregate  activity shocks have, by far, 
the largest  effects on the unemployment  and  vacancy  rates, and  generate 
the predicted counterclockwise  loops. Reallocation  and labor supply 
shocks have small effects, and the movements implied  by reallocation 
shocks are initially  flatter  than the movements along a 45 degree line 
predicted  by the  theory.  Our  findings  confirm  our  initial  visual  impression 
and the conclusions of Abraham  and Katz in the debate triggered  by 
Lilien on the importance  of sectoral shocks to aggregate  fluctuation.41 
Our  approach  to the interpretation  of the joint movement  of vacancies 
and unemployment  is more formal  than theirs but, on that point, ends 
with the same conclusion. There are large flows of job creation and 
destruction in the United States, but changes in the intensity of the 
reallocation  process do not appear  to be an important  determinant  of 
unemployment  fluctuations.  In the long run, however, effects of aggre- 
gate activity shocks disappear,  while effects of reallocation  and labor 
supply  shocks do not. This leads to the second set of conclusions. 
Part of the shift in the Beveridge relation in the postwar period is 
attributable  to the long-run  effects of reallocation  shocks, as is made 
clear by figure  11. The movements  due to changes  in aggregate  activity 
given in the figure are large but account for none of the drift in the 
relation over the period. The movements due to labor supply shocks 
account  for small  movements  of UR and VR  and, again,  for none of the 
drift.  The movements  due to reallocation  activity, however, account  for 
a steady  movement  of the unemployment  rate  upward,  by 2 percent  from 
the late 1960s  to 1984,  followed  by a decrease  of roughly  1  percent  since. 
Long-run  effects of reallocation shocks, however, are not the whole 
story. The deterministic  component  (trend)  shown in the figure  traces 
an increase  in unemployment  of 3 percent  from  the early 1950s  to 1975, 
followed, again,  by a decrease of 1 percent since, without  much  change 
in the vacancy  rate  over the whole period.  Where  does the deterministic 
component  in turn  come  from?  It may  come  from  trends  in  the  underlying 
shocks, such  as, for  example,  movements  in  reallocation  intensity  steady 
41. Abraham  and  Katz  (1986);  Lilien  (1982). 48  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Figure 11.  Decomposition of Beveridge Relation into Components Due to Trend, 
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enough  to be captured  by a deterministic  rather  than by the stochastic 
component, or from trend changes in matching,  such as, for example, 
an increased geographical  dispersion of workers and new jobs. The 
evidence presented earlier suggests that trend changes in matching, 
which we find  in our estimation  of the matching  function  for the period 
1968  to 1981,  account  for a good part  of this deterministic  trend.42 
Conclusions 
We have modeled a U.S. labor market  with large numbers  of jobs 
being constantly created and destroyed. Such a model, rather  than a 
representative agent model, or a centralized bargaining  model with 
immobile  labor, is, we think, the appropriate  starting  point for macro- 
economics. 
We have focused on the matching  process and the sources of shocks 
in the economy. Although  jobs and workers are efficiently matched, 
unemployment  and vacancies coexist because of the sheer volume of 
jobs being created and destroyed. Flows of newly hired workers, we 
find,  depend  on both  unemployment  and  vacancies. As the comovement 
of unemployment  and vacancies over the postwar  period  shows, short- 
and medium-term  fluctuations  in unemployment  have been due mainly 
to aggregate  activity shocks, shocks that lead to both more (less) job 
creation  and less (more)  job destruction,  rather  than to changes in the 
degree  in reallocation  intensity,  which  lead to parallel  movements  in  job 
creation  and  job destruction. 
We have, however, stopped  well short  of discussing  issues of "equi- 
librium  unemployment.  " The reason  is that, as a formalization  strategy, 
we have taken  the potential  level of activity, c, as well as the level of K, 
as given. Both, in turn, depend  on wages, thus on wage determination. 
42. We  intend  to follow  up  on this  statement  and  come  up  with  a more  specific  estimate. 
We have  run  into  the following  difficulty.  The theoretical  model  suggests  that  decreases  in 
matching  effectiveness should lead, like reallocation  shocks, to movements  along a 45 
degree line. This suggests that what is needed to generate the observed flat shift is a 
combination  of elements,  such  as an  increase  in  s and  a decrease  in c. The  estimated  effects 
of reallocation  shocks are also flat, however, which suggests that our theoretical  model 
may  not be the right  framework  to use for this  computation. Olivier Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  51 
Thus, the next step in building  a model of equilibrium  unemployment  is 
to draw  out the implications  of this approach  for wage determination. 
Our  model has an implicit  theory of wage determination.  Wages are 
set to allow a match  to happen  if it is mutually  profitable.  A natural  and 
appealing  formalization  of wage setting  that  has this property  is that  the 
surplus  from the match between a worker  and a firm  is shared  in some 
proportion,  an assumption  of Nash bargaining.  This assumption  implies 
that wages depend on the ratio of vacancies to unemployment,  which 
reflects  the relative  bargaining  strengths  of workers  and  firms.  The  higher 
are vacancies given unemployment,  the higher  the wage; the higher  is 
unemployment  given vacancies, the lower  the wage. Thus, it matters  for 
wages  whether  unemployment  is due  to increases  in  reallocation  intensity 
or instead to a negative aggregate  activity shock. The model suggests 
both an integrated  way of thinking  about the Phillips curve and the 
Beveridge curve and a way to learn about the workings of the labor 
market and the source of  the shocks from a joint examination of 
unemployment,  vacancies, and wages, an avenue explored by Robert 
Solow in his 1964 Wicksell lectures, or, more recently, by Richard 
Layard and Steve Nickell in their analysis of unemployment  in the 
United  Kingdom.43 
This  theory  of wage determination  may not, however, capture  impor- 
tant aspects of the labor market. A more ambitious task will be to 
consider wage-setting mechanisms that sometimes prevent mutually 
beneficial matching  from taking place. We have in mind here preset 
wages or union-negotiated  wages. Indeed, one of the challenges  of this 
approach  is to combine centralized wage setting-which,  along with 
wage drift, is  also characteristic of the U.S.  labor market-and  a 
description  of the market  that allows for the large  flows of workers  we 
have documented.  These extensions are on our agenda. 
43. Solow (1964);  Layard  and  Nickell  (1986). 52  Brookings  Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1989 
APPENDIX  A 
Data Sources and Construction 
New  Hires 
New hires  are  constructed  as gross flow  from  unemployment  to employ- 
ment, plus gross flow from out of the labor  force to employment,  plus 
estimated  employment-to-employment  quits, minus  estimated  recalls. 
Gross flow from  unemployment  to employment  and gross flow from 
out of the labor  force to employment:  in each case, the sum of male and 
female  gross flows, as adjusted  by Abowd and Zellner  (in data  from  the 
authors),  deseasonalized  by removing  all power from frequencies  in a 
band  around  seasonal  frequencies. 
Estimated  employment-to-employment  quits: 0.4 times quit rate in 
manufacturing  times aggregate employment from household survey. 
Quit  rate  in  manufacturing  (RQ  UITM)  and  aggregate  employment  (EHH) 
from  Data Resources, Inc., U.S. Central  Data Bank. 
Estimated recalls: 1.5 times (manufacturing  accession rate minus 
manufacturing  new hire rate) times manufacturing  employment  from 
establishment  survey. New hire rate (NHR) from DRI. Manufacturing 
accession  rate  (LPACCM)  and  manufacturing  employment  (LPEM)  from 
Citibase,  Citicorp  Databank  Services. 
Pool  of  Workers 
Unemployment: total unemployment  from the household survey 
(UHH) from  DRI. 
Persons not in the labor force wanting a job now: quarterly  series, 
Employment and Earnings, table A-53. 
Job losers on layoff: Employment and Earnings, table A-14. 
Long-term  unemployment:  persons  unemployed  for  27  weeks or  more 
(U27&W) from DRI. 
Short-term  unemployment:  persons unemployed for less  than 27 
weeks (UHH  -  U27& W) from DRI. Olivier  Jean Blanchard  and Peter Diamond  53 
Vacancies 
Vacancies:  help-wanted  index (LHELX)  from Citibase  times adjust- 
ment factor. The adjustment  factor is obtained by first regressing  the 
logarithm  of the adjustment  factor in Abraham  (1987), table A. 1, on a 
quadratic  in  time  forthe  period  1960  to 1985.  During  thatperiod,  Abraham 
estimates  that  the ratio  of the help-wanted  index to vacancies  increased 
35 percent.  The estimated  exponential  trend  is then assumed  to hold for 
the period  1952  to 1988  and  used to multiply  the help-wanted  index series 
for that period. The level of the resulting  series is adjusted  so that the 
average  vacancy rate  is equal  to 2.2 percent  for the period 1969  to 1981. 
Labor Force 
Labor  force: Civilian  labor  force from household survey (LC) from 
DRI. 
APPENDIX  B 
Construction and Identification of the VAR 
Representation 
THIS  APPENDIX  shows how we recover the shocks,  their dynamic effects, 
and their  contribution  to movements  in unemployment,  vacancies, and 
the labor  force. 
From the Theoretical Model to the VAR Representation 
Let X  =  [L, V, U]' be the vector composed of the labor force, 
vacancies, and unemployment  (where  L, V, and U denote either  levels 
or logarithms,  an issue taken  up later).  Let Z = [f, c, s]' be the vector of 
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We can think of our theoretical  model as yielding a dynamic relation 
between  X and  Z of the form 
(B. 1)  X  = B(L)Z,  B(O) = Bo, 
where  B(L)  is an infinite-order  matrix  lag polynomial. 
In writing  equation  B. 1 as we do, we take two shortcuts.  The first  is 
that the theoretical analysis is presented in continuous time while 
equation B.1 is, for estimation purposes, written as a discrete time 
system. Estimation  of a continuous  time model with discrete time data 
raises  a number  of well-known  issues, which  we shall  not  discuss  further. 
The second and  more  important  shortcut  is that  the theoretical  model is 
nonlinear,  both in the variables  and  in the shocks, while equation  B.  1 is 
linear  in both. There is no simple way of handling  those nonlinearities 
without  estimating  a tightly  specified  structural  model, something  we do 
not want  to do at this  point. We  therefore  estimate  a linear  system, which 
must be thought  of as a linear  approxirnation  to the true  joint process. 
An indirect  test of whether  this approximation  is acceptable  is provided 
by  subsample stability tests given below, as the subsamples have 
different  mean  unemployment  and  vacancy rates. 
Equation  B  .1 gives the behavior  of X as a function  of Z, the vector of 
shocks. Let Z itself follow a linear  stochastic  process given by 
(B.2)  Z =  C(L)E,  where E(EE')  =  V, CO  = I, 
where  E  [Ef,  E,,  EJ' is the vector of white noise innovations  tof, c, and 
s, and  CO  I  is a normalization.  Then,  replacing  equation  B .2 in equation 
B. 1  gives X as a distributed  lag of e: 
(B. 3)  X  =  A(L)E, where A(L)  =  B(L)C(L), E(EE')  =  V. 
From  the normalizations  above, AO  =  Bo.  The matrix  polynomial  A(L), 
which  gives the effects of innovations  in the underlying  shocksf, s, and 
c, is a convolution  of the matrix  polynomials  in equations  B.2 and B.3. 
Put another way, the dynamic behavior of X comes both from the 
intrinsic  dynamics  of the system, characterized  by B(L), and from the 
dynamics  of the shocks themselves, characterized  by C(L). 
With  clear  abuse  of language,  we refer  to equation  B .3 as the structural 
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autoregression  (VAR)  reduced  form.  Estimation  of a VAR  does not yield 
equation  B.3 directly  but rather  the reduced  form: 
(B.4)  X  =  D(L),q,  E(rlq')  =  1,  Do  =  I, 
where q =  [1,  v, u]' is the vector  of reduced-form  innovations,  the vector 
of unexpected movements in L,  V, and U, and the VAR is written 
in moving average form. From equations B.3 and B.4, it follows that 
-  =  BoE and  that  A(L) = D(L)BO,  so that  knowledge  of Bo  is sufficient  to 
go from  equation  B.4 to equation  B.3. 
Our empirical  strategy is therefore  the following. We first estimate 
the reduced-form  equation  B.4. We  then  make  identification  restrictions, 
which allow us to identify  Bo  and to go back from the reduced  form to 
the structural  model equation B.3. We can then characterize  not the 
dynamic effects of the shocks themselves, but the dynamic effects of 
innovations  to those shocks on the labor force, vacancies, and unem- 
ployment. 
Reduced-Form  Estimation 
We use monthly  data,  from 1952  through  1988  (444  observations).  We 
use the labor  force and  unemployment  series  from  the household  survey, 
and,  for vacancies, the adjusted  help-wanted  series described  in Appen- 
dix A. 
The theoretical model is neither linear nor loglinear. To allow for 
geometric  growth,  we perform  estimation  using  logarithms  of the varia- 
bles. We have also looked at estimation  results using logarithms  of the 
labor force, employment  (rather  than unemployment),  and vacancies, 
which imply a more approximately  linear  relation  between unemploy- 
ment and the labor force; results are very similar. All variables are 
normalized  (that is, the logarithms  are multiplied  by an appropriate 
constant)  so that  all the coefficients  reported  below have the interpreta- 
tion of derivatives,  evaluated  at sample  means. 
We use levels (of logarithms)  rather  than first differences  or cointe- 
grated  estimation.  The evidence strongly  suggests  that  all  three  variables 
are nonstationary,  whether  or not a deterministic  time trend  is included. 
Results of cointegration  tests among the three variables, or between 56  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
Table B-1.  Results of Cointegration Tests for Unemployment, Vacancies, 
and the Labor Force,  1952-88 
t-statiStiCa 
Test  DF  ADFI  ADF2 
Among L,  U,  V  - 2.33  -1.10  -2.49 
Critical valueb  (-3.47)  (-3.51)  (-3.83) 
Between  L,  V  -  1.38  -2.44  -2.31 
L, U  -0.78  -1.71  -2.99 
U,  V  -  1.85  -  2.59  -0.92 
Critical valueb  (-3.02)  (-2.98)  (-3.51) 
a.  DF:  t-statistic  on coefficient  on x_ X in a regression  of  ax  on x1.  ADFI:  t-statistic  on coefficient  on x_  in a 
regression  of  Ax on x -  and twelve  lags of  Ax. ADF2:  same  as  ADFI,  but with time  trend included in first stage 
regressions.  In each case x is the residual in a regression of the first variable of the cointegration test on the remaining 
one or two variables. 
b.  Critical values  at the  10 percent  level  (from Engle-Yoo,  1987). 
pairs of variables, with or without a deterministic  trend, are given in 
table B-1. There  is no evidence of cointegration  among  the three series, 
or between any pair of series. We prefer, nevertheless, not to impose 
nonstationarity  of unemployment  rates or vacancy rates, and thus do 
estimation in levels. The usual caveat about standard  deviations and 
other statistics  reported  below applies. 
On the basis of likelihood  ratio  tests, we estimate  the VAR, equation 
B .4, allowing  for 12  lags on each variable.  We have examined  subsample 
stability, cutting the sample at the end of  1972. The hypothesis of 
subsample  stability  of the VAR is rejected  by a maximum  likelihood  test 
at approximately  the 2 percent  level; but we find  little difference  across 
subsamples between the implied impulse responses (the definition  of 
those impulse  responses is given below). Thus, we treat  the sample  as a 
whole in what  follows. 
The results of estimation are summarized  in table B-2, which also 
gives F-tests associated with the hypotheses that the set of coefficients 
on each variable  in each equation  is equal  to zero. 
An economic analysis of the properties of the estimated dynamic 
system must await identification.  Note, however, the very high signifi- 
cance level of vacancies in the unemployment  equation;  this is due in 
part  to the effect of vacancies lagged  once, which affect unemployment 
with  a coefficient  of close to minus  one. Given  the normalization  we use, 
the implication  is that, other things  being equal, one more vacancy this 
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Table B-2.  Coefficients of Independent Variables: Sum and Significance Level of the Set, 
1952-88 a 
Left-hand  side variable 
L  U  V 
Significance  level of the set of coefficients  onb 
L  0.00  0.05  0.81 
U  0.04  x  10-  0.00  0.24 
V  0.05  0.16  x  10-1o  0.00 
Sum of coefficients  on 
L  0.98c  0.00  0.00 
U  0.06c  0.99c  0.00 
V  0.26c  -0.02  0.96c 
a.  All regressions  in levels  of natural logs,  with  12 lags for each  variable and a constant. 
b.  Numbers  reported are F-test  results associated  with the hypothesis  that the set of coefficients  on a given right- 
hand variable is equal to zero. 
c.  Significantly different from zero at I percent level. 
Identification 
What  we get  from  VAR  estimation  is the set of reduced-form  residuals. 
Denote by 1,  v, and u the reduced-form  innovations  in L, V, and U (the 
residuals from estimation of the reduced form). Table B-3 gives the 
standard  deviations as well as the correlations  between those innova- 
tions. Because we find it more intuitive to think in terms of the labor 
force, vacancies, and employment,  the table also gives standard  devia- 
tions and  correlations  between 1,  v, and  e, where  e is defined  as 1- u, and 
thus  has the interpretation  of the innovation  in employment.  The striking 
characteristic  of this table is the large  correlation  between employment 
and  labor  force innovations. 
Table B-3.  Correlations between Reduced-Form Innovations, 1952-88 
Correlations  Standard 
Innovation  1  u  v  deviation 
I  1.00  0.27  0.01  ir/=0.00320 
u  1.00  -0.34  =  0.00190 
v  1.00  =  0.00054 
I  e  v 
I  1.00  0.82  0.01  u1=0.00320 
ea  1.00  0.22  0e=.00290 
v  1.00  =  0.00054 
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Under our interpretation  of the joint behavior  of L,  V, and U, those 
correlations  reflect  thejoint  dependence  of the  reduced-form  innovations 
on Ef, Ec, and Es,  the labor supply, aggregate  activity, and reallocation 
innovations, respectively. We specify the following set of relations 
between structural  and  reduced-form  innovations  as 
1 =  0(-Es  +  a%Ec) +  Ef, 
(B.  5)  v =  IEs +  EC, 
e  =  -es  +  ?-Ec +  XEf. 
We expect all parameters  as defined  to have a positive sign. Positive 
reallocation  innovations are assumed to increase vacancies, decrease 
employment,  and, through  employment,  decrease the labor  force. Pos- 
itive aggregate  activity  innovations  increase  vacancies  and  employment, 
and, through employment, increase the labor force.  Labor supply 
innovations  increase  the labor  force and may increase  employment.  All 
these effects-except  for the effects of labor supply innovations on 
employment,  to which we return  below-are  what is predicted  by our 
minimalist  model, extended  to allow for endogeneity  of the labor  force, 
the model given by equation 16. If the time unit were short  enough, the 
coefficients  in equation  B  .5 would  correspond  to the instantaneous  direct 
effects of each of the shocks on each of the three variables  L, V, and U 
in that model. As the time unit increases, indirect effects through 
movements in L,  V, and U become relevant; we shall ignore these 
indirect effects in thinking about identification.  The innovations are 
normalized  by assuming  that  the effect of the labor  supply  innovation  on 
the labor  force is one, the effect of the aggregate  activity innovation  on 
vacancies is  one,  and the effect of  the reallocation innovation on 
employment  is minus  one. 
We then achieve identification  by a set of three assumptions. 
First, we assume  that  the three  structural  innovations  Ef, Es, and  Ec  are 
uncorrelated,  that  the matrix  Vin equation  B.2 is diagonal.  This  assump- 
tion is discussed  in the text. 
Our formal model implies that an exogenous increase in the labor 
force should  have no instantaneous  effect on employment,  thus that  X  in 
the third  part  of equation  B.5 is equal  to zero. In this case, labor  supply 
innovations,  Ef, can be obtained  as the residuals  of a regression  of 1  on e, 
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of 0.8, a within-the-month  increase in the labor force of 8 workers  for 
any 10 workers employed; this estimated coefficient reflects the very 
high  correlation  between  employment  and  labor  force innovations  in the 
correlation  matrix  of the reduced-form  residuals,  which  was reported  in 
table B-3.44  We find the estimated  value of 0 implausibly  high, and we 
are led to conclude that an exogenous increase in the labor force is 
probably  associated  with some increase  in employment,  that some  jobs 
are created because new workers enter, or suppressed as existing 
workers  leave, the labor  force. Thus, we allow for a positive value of X. 
A given value of X implies a given value of 0 and vice versa. In what 
follows, we choose a value of 0 equal  to 0.4, which implies  a value of X 
of 0.5. We have found that impulse responses are nearly invariant  to 
values of 0 between 0.3 to 0.6, which  imply  values  for X  of 0.57 and  0.34, 
respectively.4 
Finally, we identify  aggregate  activity and reallocation  innovations, 
EC  and E, by assuming  that E, affects unemployment  and vacancies in 
opposite directions  for at least n months  and that  E, affects them in the 
same direction  for at least n months. This in effect defines  EC  and E and, 
as discussed in the text, these are more general definitions  than those 
used in our theoretical  model. This set of assumptions  imposes a set of 
tight  restrictions  on the pair  (ac,  1). Given  one of the two parameters,  the 
other  is identified.46  For each value  of a-,  we can obtain  1, and  derive  the 
44. We have  explored  the robustness  of this high  correlation  at length.  To see whether 
it came in part  from  common  measurement  errors  in employment  and  the labor  force, we 
constructed  the labor  force series  by adding  to unemployment  the employment  series  from 
the establishment  survey  rather  than  from  the household  survey.  The  correlation  between 
I so constructed  and  e defined  again  as 1- u is lower, but still  equal  to 0.7. 
We  would  expect seasonal  flows  into  the labor  force  to be associated  with  job creation. 
Thus,  to see whether  the results  could  be due  to seasonal  effects left in the series  after  X1I 
deseasonalization,  we deseasonalized  the non-seasonally-adjusted  series by using fre- 
quency  domain  deseasonalization  with large  seasonal  bands.  The correlation  so obtained 
is still  equal  to 0.74. 
45. The  model  so defined  is actually  overidentified.  One  can  relax  this  overidentification 
by allowing  for  an effect  of Ef on v as well. This  coefficient,  when  estimated,  is nearly  equal 
to zero. 
46. The problem  is very similar  to the standard  problem  of identification  of the supply 
and  the demand  curve. Given  an assumed  slope  for the demand  curve, we can identify  the 
supply  curve, and  reciprocally.  Here, we have two shocks, E, and  E,. The first  one affects 
both variables  in the same direction, the second affects them in opposite directions. 
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impulse responses of all variables  with respect to each of the shocks. 
We then look for values of ac  such that the effects of EC  be of opposite 
signs on unemployment  and vacancies, and the effects of E, be of the 
same sign on unemployment  and vacancies, for at least n months.47  For 
n equal  to nine months,  this leads to a narrow  band  of values  for a-,  from 
1.8 (for  which e  = 0.00) to 3.0 (for which e  = 0.06). For values outside 
the band,  impulse  responses  have unemployment  and  vacancies  moving 
generally together, so that both shocks look like aggregate activity 
shocks. One can therefore  see our identification  restrictions  as making 
the strongest  case for reallocation  shocks. We choose a value of ax  equal 
to  2.2 (which implies e  =  0.02); we  also have calculated impulse 
responses  for values  of ac  of 2.0 and  2.8 and  found  them  to be very similar 
to those obtained  under ac =  2.2. Note, for future reference, that the 
values of 1 in the acceptable  range  are far smaller  than the value of 1, 
implied  by our simple  model (for  the specific  definition  of s used there). 
The benchmark  case discussed in the text uses values of 0.4 for 0 and 
2.2 for ac.  Impulse responses obtained under the alternative  assump- 
tions-0  =  0.3, ac =  2.2; 0 =  0.6, ac =  2.2; 0 =  0.4, a  =  2.0; and 0  = 
0.4, ac  = 2.8-are  available  upon  request. 
Given those assumptions, we can estimate, using the method of 
moments,  the parameters  and standard  deviations  of the E's in equation 
B.5. Having recovered Bo, we can recover the structural  model and 
characterize  the dynamic  effects of the  's on L, V, and U. 
47. To pursue  the analogy  of the previous  footnote, this is the dynamic  equivalent  to 
the question:  what assumed  slopes for the supply  curve are consistent  with the demand 
curve sloping  downwards  ? Comments 
and Discussion 
Robert E. Hall: The paper  by Olivier  Blanchard  and Peter  Diamond  is 
a careful  exercise in model  building.  It does not try  to settle controversial 
questions in macroeconomics.  Though  its goals are more modest than 
those of many  Brookings  papers,  the paper  is highly  instructive  on some 
major  issues about the operation  of the labor market.  The authors  see 
job-worker  matching  as another  substantive  economic activity, capable 
of description  by a production  function.  I think  the resulting  intellectual 
discipline  is a big step forward. 
One problem  facing  this type of research  is the disproportionate  role 
of certain  types of workers  in the turnover  process. On the one hand, 
the labor  market  has high  average  turnover;  about  4 percent  of workers 
take new jobs each month. On the other hand, about 50 percent of 
workers  at any one time have been on the job for three years or more; 
their  turnover  rates are only a fraction  of a percent  a month.  Teenagers 
and other high-turnover  workers  with very brief previous employment 
dominate the turnover process. It is crucial to understand  that the 
matching  function estimated in this paper tells us how teenagers find 
jobs in services and trade, not how the market  works for experienced 
workers  with substantial  human  capital. With considerable  additional 
effort,  Blanchard  and  Diamond  might  be able  to estimate  a disaggregated 
model, using  microeconomic  data  for workers  and  detailed  help-wanted 
advertising  data  for vacancies. 
Blanchard  and  Diamond  do not hide the infirmities  of the data. Gross 
flows data  from the Current  Population  Survey  are well known to have 
substantial  biases; the results in the paper are very dependent  on the 
accuracy  of the  Abowd-Zellner  adjustments.  Katharine  Abraham's  work 
has shown the strengths  and weaknesses of help-wanted  advertising  as 
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a measure of the vacancy rate. A particular  problem with the help- 
wanted  data  is the lack of information  about  the trend  in the relation  of 
advertising  to vacancies, which is an important  issue in Blanchard  and 
Diamond's paper. Finally, unemployment  is notoriously  hard  to mea- 
sure. Only  about  half the people who are not working  but say they want 
to work are counted as unemployed.  Only about half those counted as 
unemployed consider  job search their primary  activity in the survey 
week of the CPS. Again, there may be important  changes over time in 
the relation  between measured  unemployment  and the volume of job- 
seeking  activity. 
One of the most important  contributions  of the paper  is the develop- 
ment  of a matching  function  for  the U. S. economy. Stocks  of unemployed 
workers  and vacant  jobs are the inputs,  and  job matches  (new hires)  are 
the output.  Estimates  of the matching  function  by ordinary  least squares 
are likely to understate  the elasticities with respect to both U and V. A 
random  shift in matching  affects both U and V: each spontaneous  new 
hire lowers both unemployment  and vacancies. The answer is to find 
instruments  that  are  arguably  uncorrelated  with  these spontaneous  shifts 
in the matching  function. Blanchard  and Diamond present one set of 
results  based on the use of lagged U and V  as instruments.  Lagged  right- 
hand variables are eligible as instruments  only when there is a good 
reason to exclude the possibility  that the same force that  raised U or V 
in one month shifts the matching  process down in the next month. I'm 
not sure I see why this should necessarily be the case. Blanchard  and 
Diamond  also present results based on the use of measures of overall 
economic activity  as instruments.  Here, the crucial  identifying  assump- 
tion is that the force that activates the economy does not also activate 
the matching  process. Business cycle theories relying on exogenous 
technological shocks might well imply that the matching  technology 
improved  at the same time that  production  technology  improved.  Simi- 
larly, theories invoking the idea of induced shifts in matching and 
production  technology-thick-market effects-would  also imply a fail- 
ure of the identifying  assumption  adopted  by Blanchard  and Diamond. 
As I read the evidence, economywide thick-market  effects are one of 
the most promising  ways to explain the business cycle, so I remain 
skeptical  about  the identifying  assumption. 
Matching  functions ought to have increasing returns to scale. In 
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many  people are carrying  coconuts looking  for a trade),  it is more  likely 
that any given person will find a match. Pure increases in scale, 
corresponding  to increases in the density of searchers, improve the 
efficiency of the search  of any one worker  or employer.  Blanchard  and 
Diamond's  empirical  results  give some support  for  the increasing  returns 
prediction.  When  industrial  production  lags two through  five is used as 
the instrument,  the elasticity of matching  with respect to equipropor- 
tional changes in U and V is 1.35. However, it is clear from the other 
results in table 1 that this finding  is highly  fragile.  The overall thrust  of 
table 1 is closer to constant  returns. 
Blanchard  and Diamond's  empirical  setup is too simple to make the 
distinction  between intensive and extensive growth, a distinction  that 
becomes important  with increasing  returns. If the movements of the 
economy involve the replication of individual  labor market units at 
varying  rates,  with  little  change  in  the scale of each  unit,  then  the constant 
returns  finding  would be expected. If the swings are mostly changes in 
the density of operation  of the same group  of markets,  then increasing 
returns  would  be expected. 
There  is also a question  in my mind  whether  the model  takes adequate 
account  of changing  specialization.  Consider  the cross-sectional  version 
of the Blanchard-Diamond  regression. If it too  showed essentially 
constant returns,  then it would mean that active, dense labor markets 
such as New York  City  generate  the same  flow of matches  per  combined 
unit of  unemployment and vacancies as  do lower-density, smaller 
markets. But this finding  may simply reflect the much higher level of 
specialization  in the large dense markets.  That is, the benefit  of better 
matching  in large  dense markets  may be taken in the form of moderate 
matching  rates for highly specialized workers rather  than very rapid 
matching  for the less specialized  workers  and  jobs in smaller,  less dense 
markets. Absent consideration of specialization, the Diamond-Blan- 
chard approach gives the misleading impression that there are no 
efficiency  benefits  to large  dense markets.  But  there  must  be some reason 
that  so many  workers  and  jobs choose to locate in New York, given the 
high  congestion  costs and  location  rents  there. 
A number  of economists, including  George Akerlof, Janet Yellen, 
and Lawrence Summers, have asserted that rationing  of jobs is an 
important  feature of the U.S. labor market.  That is, wages exceed the 
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trarily  from  among  a large  pool of applicants  for each  job. As Blanchard 
and  Diamond  note, the important  role of unemployment  in the matching 
function suggests that rationing  is far from universal.  If the number  of 
job-seekers  is a constraint  on the volume  of new hires, strict  rationing  is 
not occurring.  Of course, the mere  existence of substantial  help-wanted 
advertising  and other recruiting  efforts by employers in some markets 
shows that  rationing  is probably  not important  in those markets. 
Blanchard  and Diamond  join Edward  Prescott in their approach  to 
model  building.  They  are  more  interested  in  the  fundamentals  of resource 
allocation  than  in the operation  of the price system. They see the wage 
as one of the tools used in the market  to allocate labor, not as a basic 
variable. In particular,  wage rigidity  is not a given of the model. In a 
recession, when the rate of departure  of workers  from  jobs increases, 
we cannot  tell whether  there  has been a true downward  shift in produc- 
tivity relative to the value of time (as in Prescott's models) or whether 
the employer  and worker stick doggedly to a wage that overstates the 
value  of time  (the  Keynesian  rigid-wage  view). Rather  than  try  to resolve 
this central dispute, the authors use a setup that encompasses both 
views. 
The second part  of the paper  builds a model of standard  time series 
data on the labor market.  Figure  8 shows the conclusion-movements 
of U and V are dominated  in the short  run  by cyclical movements  along 
the Beveridge  curve, but the curve drifted  outward  until  recently. I am 
not at all sure that the formidable  apparatus  in this paper, involving a 
structural  VAR, adds very much  to this simple  point. In an unpublished 
comment  on Blanchard  and  Diamond's  paper,  Allan  Drazen  has pointed 
out that the structural  interpretation  is vulnerable  to aggregation  prob- 
lems. Drazen  gives the following  example. There  are two sectors in the 
labor  market.  In the first, employers  attract  workers  with help-wanted 
ads. For  unrelated  reasons, average  unemployment  is low. In the second 
sector, ads are not used, and average unemployment  is high, also for 
unrelated  reasons. A shift  in demand  occurs, favoring  the second sector 
over  the first.  Vacancies  rise  and  unemployment  falls. But  the Blanchard- 
Diamond  apparatus  calls this a cyclical shock. 
Diamond  and  Blanchard  have made  significant  progress  on building  a 
consistent empirical  model of the operation  of the labor  market.  I look 
forward  to additional  work  at  greater  levels of disaggregation-geograph- 
ical and  demographic.  The hardheaded  production  theory  they advocate 
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Janet Yellen: Olivier Blanchard  and Peter Diamond have written an 
important  paper  that  examines  the neglected  stepsister  of macroeconom- 
ics-the  Beveridge curve.' As might  be anticipated,  the stepsister has 
an interesting  story to tell: short- and medium-run  movements  in U.S. 
unemployment  during the postwar period have been dominated by 
cyclical, and not sectoral, shocks. 
A leading  question-perhaps the  leading  question-in macroeconom- 
ics since the publication  in 1982  of David  Lilien's  paper,  "Sectoral  Shifts 
and Cyclical Unemployment,"  is whether sectoral, rather  than aggre- 
gate, shocks are the key factor responsible for fluctuations in the 
unemployment  rate.  According  to the sectoral  shifts  hypothesis,  fluctua- 
tions in demand  across sectors account  for a substantial  fraction  of the 
variation  in unemployment  in the postwar period. Demand shifts can 
cause at least temporary  increases  in unemployment  if people who lose 
their  jobs in contracting  sectors take time to search or retool for new 
jobs in sectors that  are  expanding.  Lilien's evidence  in favor  of this view 
is the  positive  correlation  between  the dispersion  of sectoral  employment 
growth rates and the unemployment rate. However, as  Katharine 
Abraham  and Lawrence  Katz showed, the sectoral  shifts and  aggregate 
demand  explanations  of movements  in unemployment  are "observation- 
ally  equivalent"  if sectors  differ  with  respect  to their  cyclical  sensitivities 
and their trend growth rates and cyclical sensitivities are negatively 
correlated. 
Since  each  generation  of economists  views its formulation  of problems 
as new, it may  be useful  to note that  the structural  view of unemployment 
is a hardy  perennial.  It comes up  whenever  unemployment  is persistently 
high. In 1939  in the United States many economists viewed unemploy- 
ment  as structural.  Robert  Solow's Wicksell  lectures  in 1964  responded 
to the view that  the high  unemployment  rates  of the 1960s  were structural 
in origin. 
In attempting  to determine  whether the structural-sectoral  view is 
empirically  relevant, the behavior of vacancies provides useful infor- 
mation.  To distinguish  between  the sectoral  shifts  and  aggregate  demand 
hypotheses, Abraham  and Katz examined  the comovements of vacan- 
cies,  unemployment, and Lilien's measure of  sectoral shocks (the 
dispersion of employment growth rates). Under the sectoral shifts 
1. These comments were prepared  jointly with George Akerlof, who discussed a 
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hypothesis,  movements  in vacancies  would  be positively  correlated  with 
sectoral shocks; under the aggregate demand hypothesis, negative 
comovements between Lilien's measure and vacancies would occur 
instead. They found a negative correlation between movements of 
vacancies and Lilien's measure  of sectoral dispersion-providing sup- 
port  for the aggregate  demand  hypothesis. 
This  imaginative  paper  by Blanchard  and  Diamond  extends  the insight 
of Abraham  and  Katz and  employs  a useful  and  interesting  methodology 
for decomposing changes in unemployment  into the portions due to 
cyclical (aggregate  demand)  shocks, sectoral  (reallocation)  shocks, and, 
additionally,  labor supply shocks. In disentangling  the relative contri- 
butions of these three kinds of shocks to unemployment  fluctuations, 
the authors  make  use of information  available  from  the comovements  of 
three variables:  vacancies, unemployment,  and the labor  force. As the 
authors  hint  in  their  paper,  their  methodology  may  be extended  to include 
wages and  ultimately  provide  an integrated  and simultaneous  treatment 
of the Phillips  and  Beveridge  curves. 
The methodology  employed by Blanchard  and Diamond  to identify 
changes  in unemployment  due to cyclical and  sectoral  shocks represents 
a significant  advance over the strategy implicitly  used by economists 
who simply "eyeball" plots of the vacancy-unemployment  data. Sup- 
pose, as has frequently  been assumed, that the Beveridge  curve can be 
approximated  as  a rectangular  hyperbola with the functional form 
uv =  k. Then structural  shocks occur when the product  of u and  v (=  k) 
changes.  Further,  suppose  that  purely  sectoral  shifts  lead  to proportional 
movements  of both u and  v along  a ray  from  the origin  in uv space. Then, 
it is straightforward  to decompose any change in u and v, say from (ul, 
vI) to (u2, v2)  into the structural  change (A us)  and the cyclical change  in 
unemployment  (A uc). The variable  A us is the change  in unemployment 
that  would occur if the u / v ratio  had  remained  constant  but the product 
of u and  v changed  as it in fact did. The cyclical change  in unemployment 
is the difference  between the total change  and the structural  change-a 
movement  along  the new Beveridge  curve. The basic identifying  restric- 
tions used here are that structural  shocks leave the u / v ratio constant 
while cyclic shocks leave the product  of u and v constant. These two 
restrictions  identify the angle of movement of a structural  shock in uv 
space (along  a ray  from  the origin)  and  the movement  of a cyclical shock 
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Blanchard  and Diamond's  methodology  represents  an advance over 
the simplistic  eyeball method and makes clear the problems  with such 
methodology.  First, it is by no means clear that sectoral shocks would 
shift v and u along a ray from the origin. In the authors' theoretical 
model, such shocks shift  the equilibrium  along  a  450 line  from  any starting 
point. Second, it is ad hoc to assume  that  the Beveridge  curve is exactly 
described  by a rectangular  hyperbola.  Third,  it cannot  be assumed  that 
vacancies and unemployment  are continuously  in the steady-state  rela- 
tion described  by the Beveridge  curve. Movements  of v and u following 
shocks may exhibit some dynamics so that time must elapse before v 
and u settle down to their steady-state relationship  after a shock has 
occurred.  The authors'  explicit  model  of the Beveridge  curve delineates 
the dynamic  responses whereby  long-run  and short-run  responses of u 
and v to given shocks differ. Finally, there may be shocks other than 
sectoral or cyclical shocks that affect the behavior of vacancies and 
unemployment. The authors' model incorporates several additional 
disturbances:  autonomous  changes  in labor  force participation;  changes 
in the rate of capital  accumulation;  changes in the "autonomous"  quit 
rate; and shifts in the matching  function, which determines  the rate at 
which  vacantjobs  and  unemployed  workers  succeed  in  forming  matches. 
Blanchard and Diamond develop a way to  decompose sectoral, 
cyclical, and labor supply shocks that is much more general  than that 
implicit in the eyeball technique. They estimate and then interpret  a 
"just-identified"  vector  autoregression,  using  their  results  to decompose 
postwar  movements  in unemployment  ( U), vacancies  ( V),  and  the labor 
force ( L), into their  ultimate  cyclical, sectoral,  and  labor  supply  shocks. 
The dynamic  system that  is estimated  provides  an empirical  counterpart 
to the system of differential  equations generated by their theoretical 
model. The VAR system can then be used to estimate  the values of the 
underlying  shocks to the system (the historical  values of the cyclical, 
structural,  and  labor  force shocks) and  the proportion  of the variance  in 
U, V, and  L due to these three types of shocks at various  horizons;  the 
impulse  response  functions  reveal how isolated shocks affect U, V, and 
L over time. 
In order to recover the values of the "underlying" shocks (the 
innovations in c, s, and D) after estimating  the VAR (reduced form) 
system and to use the estimated model to simulate the impacts of 
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that are not directly  testable. In particular  it is necessary to specify the 
relations  between innovations  in the underlying  shocks and  innovations 
in the VAR reduced  form. Blanchard  and Diamond  make the following 
assumptions  to achieve identification:  first,  cyclical and sectoral  shocks 
result  in innovations  in labor  force participation  that are  proportional  to 
innovations in employment. This is based on the assumption  in their 
model that changes in labor force participation  depend on changes in 
employment  but not on the level of or changes in vacancies. Second, 
sectoral,  cyclical, and  labor  force shocks are  contemporaneously  uncor- 
related. Third, an autonomous increase in the labor supply raises 
employment contemporaneously  by 50 percent of the new entrants. 
Fourth,  a sectoral  shock  that  initially  lowers  employment  by a coefficient 
of 1 (and  raises unemployment  by a coefficient  of 0.6 as a consequence 
of some contemporaneous  discouraged  worker  effect) raises vacancies 
contemporaneously  by a coefficient of only 0.02. This last identifying 
assumption  is equivalent  to assuming  that  a purely  sectoral  shock  initially 
moves unemployment  and vacancies along  a line in uv space with slope 
0.033-almost horizontal.  In  contrast,  the  theoretical  model  of Blanchard 
and Diamond  predicts equal declines in employment  and increases in 
vacancies as a consequence  of sectoral  shocks. 
These identifying  assumptions  are potentially  open to criticism.  The 
dependence of  changes in labor force participation  on changes in 
employment  is due to a significant  discouraged  worker  effect, so that  as 
actual employment  rises, discouraged  workers reenter  the labor force 
and become counted  among  the unemployed.  But, plausibly,  with such 
a discouraged  worker  effect, labor  force participation  also depends on 
vacancies. The posting of job vacancies and the active attempts of 
managers  to fill those vacancies may induce discouraged  workers to 
search  for and take  jobs. 
The assumption  that sectoral, cyclical, and labor force shocks are 
contemporaneously  uncorrelated is important in disentangling  U.S. 
history. Blanchard  and Diamond  see no reason for such a correlation. 
They consider, for example, the case of an oil shock that has both 
sectoral and aggregate demand implications. Lower oil prices raise 
aggregate  demand,  while higher  oil prices  lower it; yet more  reallocation 
is required  in both instances, so that the shocks to c and s are uncorre- 
lated. While there may be no theoretical  reason to assume that c and s 
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empirically  false. The  recent  work  of Steven  Davis and  John  Haltiwanger 
suggests that sectoral shocks and cyclic shocks are not uncorrelated. 
Using quarterly  data  from 1979  to 1983  from  the Longitudinal  Establish- 
ment  Datafile  (LED), they find  a negative  correlation  between  gross  job 
turnover  (the sum of gross  job creation  at new and expanding  establish- 
ments and gross  job destruction  at shrinking  and dying  establishments) 
and  net employment  growth  for every two-digit  industry  except tobacco. 
This  suggests  that,  even within  broad  industrial  sectors, positive  cyclical 
shocks are negatively  correlated  with sectoral  shocks. 
Finally, Blanchard and Diamond's fourth identifying assumption 
involves choice of the parameter 1, which is the contemporaneous 
impact  of a sectoral shock on v relative  to its impact  on u . The criterion 
applied in this choice is that the impulse response functions should 
exhibit  theoretically  expected  behavior:  cyclic shocks  cause movements 
in vacancies and unemployment  in opposite directions, while sectoral 
shocks cause movements of these variables in the same direction. 
Blanchard  and  Diamond's  identifying  assumption  ensures  that  they will 
obtain  results  that are in close accord  with the eyeball method-as  may 
be seen by comparing  their  figures  8 and 11.  The eyeball method  would 
identify  the cyclical shocks as traveling  along  rectangular  hyperbolas  in 
figure  8, resulting  in something  akin to the first part of Blanchard  and 
Diamond's figure 11, while "other shocks" would be the sum of the 
shocks in the remaining  parts of figure 11. The fact that the impulse 
response functions are forced to have "sensible" behavior  causes, in 
turn,  the structural  shocks to correspond  to the outward  movements  in 
the uv pattern  in figure  8. 
As the authors  clearly note, the possible values of i  that result in 
sensible impulse  response  functions  lie in a very narrow  range  far from 
the theoretically  expected value of 1. In effect, the authors  are  forced to 
assume that purely sectoral shocks initially  move v and u along a line 
that is close to horizontal  in the Beveridge diagram.  The fact that the 
parameter  values that satisfy this restriction  lie in such a narrow  band, 
and that the band  is so far from the theoretical  prediction  of the model, 
is unsatisfying  and suggests that something  else is amiss-that  one of 
the other  identifying  assumptions  may be incorrect. 
The authors' methodology  assumes that all shocks of a given class 
(reallocation,  cyclical, or labor  supply)  are alike in following  a common 
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period theoretically  had qualitatively  different  time series properties. 
The  oil shocks, for example,  necessitated  resource  reallocation  on a one- 
shot and not a permanent  basis. In contrast, the increased  importance 
of the service sector during  this period  almost surely  led to permanently 
higher rates of job destruction and creation; Jonathan  Leonard, for 
example, showed that gross turnover  in Wisconsin between 1979  and 
1982  was considerably  greater  in nonmanufacturing  than  in manufactur- 
ing. The methodology  in Blanchard  and Diamond's  paper  assumes that 
all such shocks follow a common lag structure.  In fact there may be 
different  types of structural  shocks. 
Just as the authors  ignore  different  types of structural  shocks, analo- 
gously they ignore various shocks that appear  in their model and may 
have been important  during  the postwar  period. For example, changes 
in the demographic  structure  of the labor  force toward  more  women and 
teenagers  help  to explain  why quits  have risen  relative  to unemployment 
and may also account for part of the outward shift in the Beveridge 
curve. In the authors'  model this shock corresponds  to a change  in their 
parameter  q. Their  model  highlights  the potential  importance  of changes 
in the pace of capital  accumulation  or technical  progress  for movements 
in  vacancies  and  unemployment.  Variations  in  both  capital  accumulation 
and technical  progress  have occurred  during  the postwar  period  but are 
not included  in the model that Blanchard  and  Diamond  estimate. 
In addition  to decomposing  sectoral and cyclical shocks, Blanchard 
and  Diamond  provide  empirical  estimates  of a matching  function,  relating 
new hires  to the stocks of vacancies  and  unemployed  workers.  Further- 
more, they creatively  use the matching  function  to test for "hysteresis" 
in the labor market. Various authors (Blanchard  and Summers and 
Pissarides, for example) have claimed that high unemployment  may 
persist because longer-term  unemployed  have no impact on the labor 
market. In the case raised by Blanchard  and Summers, this occurs 
because the long-term  unemployed  cease to be active union members 
and, therefore,  their welfare is not considered  in wage bargains.  In the 
case raised by Pissarides, this occurs because long-term  unemployed 
cease to be serious searchers  for work. 
Blanchard  and Diamond's estimates of the matching  function show 
that  long-term  unemployed  and  discouraged  workers  do positively  affect 
the rate of new hires. This test implicitly shows that there is some 
mechanism  whereby these workers affect the labor market.  This is an 
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tions of this finding  that  are consistent  with hysteresis. In particular,  the 
number  of long-term  unemployed is correlated with the stage of the 
business cycle, being greatest  at the trough.  If in a trough,  the average 
quality  of unemployed  workers  is superior  to the average  quality  of the 
unemployed at a peak (if only the lemons are left in the pool of 
unemployed  at a business cycle peak), the improved  rate of matching, 
which appears  to be due to the presence of long-term  unemployed,  may 
instead  be due to the relative  ease of finding  appropriate  workers  to fill 
vacancies. 
Finally, I have two quibbles with the empirical estimation of the 
matching  function. Blanchard  and Diamond construct their own new 
hire series rather  than using the standard  series that covers only manu- 
facturing.  It is curious that the matching  function estimated with the 
standard  series yields results that are much less sensible than those 
obtained  with the authors'  constructed  series. With  the standard  series, 
vacancies  dominate  unemployment  as a determinant  of new hires. While 
Blanchard  and Diamond obtain more sensible results from their own 
constructed  series, these series themselves have two problems  of con- 
struction.  First, they assume that  job losers invariably  suffer  a spell of 
unemployment;  second, they assume  that the fraction  of total quits  that 
involve  job shifts with no unemployment  is constant over the business 
cycle. The first assumption  is suspect; 29 percent of job losers among 
mature  men in the National  Longitudinal  Survey  between 1969  and 1971 
suffered no spell of unemployment. The limited available evidence 
concerning  the cyclical behavior of employment-to-employment  quits 
suggests  that  this fraction  varies  procyclically. 
To summarize,  I would like to emphasize  that most of my comments 
have been quibbles  and  not deep criticisms.  The idea that  movements  in 
vacancies and the labor force allow a decomposition  of cyclic versus 
structural  shocks is novel and important. The conclusions that the 
authors  reach  are sensible  and reinforce  the view that structural  shocks 
are not the dominant  factor in explaining  medium-run  movements in 
U.S. unemployment. 
General  Discussion 
Several  panelists  discussed  the difficulty  of distinguishing  shifts  in the 
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thought  it possible that the unemployment  rate is "stickier," and the 
vacancy rate quicker  to adjust,  than the authors  believe. Such a possi- 
bility  would  give  rise  to wider  countercyclical  loops around  the  Beveridge 
curve than the authors indicate, and thus assign less of the observed 
movement  to structural  shifts in the Beveridge  curve. 
Similarly,  Edmund  Phelps suggested  that the current  unemployment 
problem  in Britain,  which is perceived by many as an adverse shift of 
the Beveridge  curve, can be explained,  instead, by the sudden  increase 
in the rate of growth of employment and a corresponding  growth in 
vacancies around 1982. Such a  scenario would correspond to  the 
economy moving  to the upper  branch  of a countercyclical  loop around  a 
stationary  Beveridge  curve. Peter Diamond  responded  that labor  force 
increases are absorbed  into employment  too quickly to allow for such 
an explanation  of the apparent  shift. 
Christopher  Sims raised two issues concerning  the interpretation  of 
the VARs. First, in order  for the structural  shocks and the innovations 
to be connected  with  a linear  transformation,  the structural  shocks must 
act with short lags. Second, the number of shocks has to equal the 
number  of innovations.  In this connection,  he noted  that  the model  does 
not explicitly  allow  for  labor  supply-side  shocks-shocks  to the intensity 
with which individuals  search for jobs. Yet this may be an important 
source of variability  in the Beveridge relationship  that, in this model, 
will be mixed  with  reallocation  shocks. Katharine  Abraham  agreed  with 
Sims that supply shocks would be important  and suggested  they could 
arise  from  demographic  changes.  If demographics  worsened  mismatches 
between available  jobs and labor  during  the 1970s,  they would increase 
measured unemployment  at given vacancies, which in the authors' 
framework  would  be picked  up  as a sectoral  reallocation  shock. She also 
noted that Beveridge curves disaggregated  to the state level do not 
appear  to have shifted  outward  as much  during  the sample  period  as the 
aggregate  curve the authors  estimate. Peter Kenen noted that exchange 
rate changes  are an important  sectoral  shock, shifting  demand  between 
tradables  and nontradables.  On these grounds,  he conjectured  that the 
Beveridge curve would have shifted outward during  the 1980s when 
these shocks became  more  important. 
Charles Holt mentioned that work using biological processes has 
provided  theoretical  justification  for using the Cobb-Douglas  specifica- 
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identical  workers  to be inconsistent  with significant  time spent  in search 
behavior.  Following  up on Robert  Hall's suggestion  that  more  disaggre- 
gate analysis would be informative,  Holt pointed out the relevant  and 
highly parallel  research  carried  out at the Urban  Institute  in the 1970s 
that estimated, for 16 demographic  groups, a model of worker flows 
between employment,  unemployment,  and labor  force, as well as cor- 
responding  vacancy flows. 
Robert  Gordon  interpreted  the procyclical  nature  of quits, discussed 
in this paper, as contradicting  theories of real business cycles, which 
would predict the opposite. He asked whether the Beveridge curve 
model  had  any  implications  about  the validity  of insider-outsider  models. 
Olivier  Blanchard  responded  that a first  pass at the data  for the United 
Kingdom  suggested  that the Beveridge  and Phillips  curves had shifted 
very  much  in  unison  over the 1970s  and 1980s.  If this  finding  is confirmed, 
it would be hard  to reconcile with existing versions of insider-outsider 
models of employment.  These models suggest that shifts in bargaining 
shift  the  Phillips  curve;  they  do not suggest  a parallel  shift  in  the  Beveridge 
curve. 
Gordon tried to draw some connections between Blanchard and 
Diamond's  work  and  wage-price  behavior.  The authors'  finding  that  the 
Beveridge curve shifted out by 2 percentage  points of unemployment 
corresponds  to Gordon'  s own  measured  shift  in  the  natural  rate  (NAIRU) 
during  the same period. But his NAIRU did not shift back, while the 
authors'  Beveridge  curve reversed  half its shift out. Estimated  Phillips 
curves  imply  a major  increase  in labor  share  from 1965  to the early 1980s, 
followed by a substantial  reversal  of that  increase  in the next few years. 
To the extent that labor  market  conditions  matter  more  for wages than 
for prices, Blanchard  and Diamond's findings  may help explain why 
wages have not moved in tandem  with prices. Abraham  noted that the 
recent inward shift of the Beveridge curve suggests that inflationary 
pressures from the currently  low unemployment  rates in the United 
States are not as worrisome  as one might  think  in looking  at unemploy- 
ment alone. She also cautioned  against  assigning  too much  precision  to 
the adjusted  help-wanted  index. She was surprised  that  more  objections 
had not been raised  to its use here in light of the skeptical  response she 
got when she presented  these data  at an earlier  panel  meeting. 74  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1989 
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